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In Gratitude for What We are Given. A
Common Morality for 'the Global Age'?
WELIAM J. WAGNER +
These essays are The Catholic University of America's response to an initiative of
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the future Pope Benedict XVI, when still Prefect for the
Vatican's Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, soliciting original
scholarly research and dialogue on the "important and urgent" question of what moral
reasoning can sustain morally sound law and policy in our contemporary moment.'
This question is of manifest concern in an era of rapid social and technological
advance bringing with it the convergence, dissolution, and alteration of cultures. This
concern is magnified as large-scale unforeseen consequences of past technological
interventions in the human environment come to light, new technological
interventions in human biology give rise to worrisome moral dilemmas, and a
technocratic morality of means all too often predominates.2  Under these
circumstances, society finds itself challenged to preserve any adequate moral
compass. Cardinal Ratzinger states that "the destiny of human beings and the future
of human beings" are at issue, and attentive, fair-minded observers may well agree.
This introduction, first, sets out and evaluates the reciprocal, antiphonal steps of
"Vatican initiative" and "university response" at this collection of essays' genesis.
Once having done so, it offers the reader not only a basic synthesis of the authors'
separate contributions but also of the contours of the collection as a whole. In these
+ Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture, The Catholic University of
America.
I Letter from Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Prefect, Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, to Rev. Fr. David M.P.
O'Connell, C.M., Rector, The Catholic University of America (Oct. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Ratzinger
Letter] (on file with the Journal for Law, Philosophy and Culture). All other quotations contained in this
article that are cited from Cardinal Ratzinger's "letter" or "initiative" are from this letter.
2 The popular mind is inclined to equate these problems and dilemmas with a loss of technological
control over the human situation and environment. However, there are commentators who trace them to a
mentality associated with technology. Jacques Ellul, for instance, points out the bargain at the root of the
technological society precisely adopting, as fundamental, the mentality of "technique" in exchange for the
promise of "extraordinary comforts, hygiene, knowledge, and nourishment." JACQUES ELLUL, THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 436 (John Wilkinson trans., 1964). Pope Pius XII intuited the flaw in this
bargain in these terms:
It is beyond doubt that the weight of a flagrant contradiction presses down the human race in the
twentieth century, as if striking it in its pride: on the one hand, there is the confident expectation of
modem man, fashioner and eyewitness of the. . . "technical revolution," that he can create a world of
plenty, in wealth and goods, a word freed from poverty and uncertainty. On the other hand, there is
the bitter reality of the long years of grief and ruin, with the resulting fear ... of not succeeding in
founding even a mere modest beginning of harmony and lasting peace. Something, then, is not
proceeding aright in the internal scheme of modem life; an essential error must be sapping the
foundation. But where is that concealed? How and by whom can it be corrected?
Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1956, L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Dec. 24-25, 1956, reprinted in
PIUS XIH AND TECHNOLOGY 186-87 (1962).
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ways it offers readers an introductory roadmap to the wealth of insights that the
collection contains and those that it may in turn inspire.
I. The Origin of the Collection
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger communicated his initiative on behalf of The Sacred
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to several universities around the world,
leaving it to each university to select its own mode of response. He relayed the
request to The Catholic University of America in a letter to its president, Father David
M. O'Connell, C.M., dated October 27, 2004. 3 The present collection is The Catholic
University of America's distinctive response to Cardinal Ratzinger's challenge. This
dialectic of proposal and reply is most readily described by sketching briefly first at
the Vatican request and then at the University's response.
A. Character and Significance of the Ratzinger Initiative
The Cardinal Ratzinger letter, sent expressly with the Holy Father's encouragement,
was promulgated on the authority of the then reigning pontiff, Pope John Paul II, so
that it is fair to see it as a papal initiative. The letter bears the intellectual imprint of
Joseph Ratzinger, as theologian, who now, no less, has become John Paul's successor,
Benedict XVI. Nothing in the interim serving to diminish its pertinence, the initiative
can be seen as having the mandate of Benedict's pontificate. Thus, the initiative,
infused with the intellectual style of Joseph Ratzinger, is doubly a papal endeavor,
reflecting the mandate of two pontificates. Its distinctively papal character appears in
the scope and gravity of the problems it addresses, as well as in the breadth of the
solutions that it outlines in response to them. Its papal character appears in its
resonance with several core historic papal functions. Its more particular content, on
the other hand, derives from its purpose, which is to address the Academy.
1. The Initiative's Papal Character
As an office of unparalleled and unbroken continuity over many centuries, the Papacy
has, as it has proclaimed the Gospel, advocated, in a recurring way over time, for
intelligible terms of common agreement across cultures. 4 In the present context,
Cardinal Ratzinger, in effect, grounds just such advocacy in four historic functions of
the Papacy. These include the Papacy's service, as: 1) sign and occasion of unity, not
3 Ratzinger Letter, supra note 1.
4 As a pivotal historical instance, Walter Ullman cites a "completion of the process of amalgamating
Roman, Christian and Germanic elements in the West," under the influence of the Papacy by the early ninth
century, for example, as a cause of the "great civilizing effect" in Europe. WALTER ULLMAN, A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE PAPACY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 91 (Routledge 2003) (1972). In a more recent context,
Catholic missionaries acting under papal mandate in non-Christian cultures had to seek common modes of
adjudicating disputes with nonbelievers. For example, Catholic converts in nineteenth-century China in a
dispute over their continuing participation in commonly owned lands arrived at a settlement with a cash
payment and a withdrawal from common ownership. Charles A. Litzinger, Rural Religion and Village
Organization in North China: The Catholic Challenge in the Late Nineteenth Century, in CHRISTIANITY IN
CHINA: FROM THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 41,44-45 (Daniel H. Bays ed., 1996).
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just of the Catholic Church, 5 but of the human race; 2) moral and doctrinal teacher,
traditionally conceived as in custodianship of the "natural moral law;" 3) the highest
office in an ecclesial system of governance; and 4) a diplomatic advocate for human
rights and welfare across diverse human cultures and peoples. The Vatican's standing
to raise the questions posed by the initiative has credibility precisely because in so
doing it advances these core papal functions.
6
a. Sign and Occasion of Unity
Cardinal Ratzinger's letter opens with the goal of a "common denominator" as "held
by all people" functioning to secure "fundamental criteria for laws affecting the rights
and duties of all."'7 It concludes by disclosing that its motivation is "charity" in the
"service to culture, politics, the economy and the family" and by naming as its
ultimate concern "the destiny of human beings and the future of civilization will be
everywhere respected."'8  The underlying premise of the letter is the Papacy's
symbolic identification with the moral solidarity of the human race and the moral
unity of human experience. At each step of the initiative, Cardinal Ratzinger
implicitly relies for standing to speak on the Papacy's historic role symbolizing these
elements of unity.
9
The Papacy's own self-understanding is, of course, that it has such symbolism by
divine conferral, but it cultivates, as well, the interreligious and secular recognition of
that symbolism for its merely functional and practical value in the service of the
world. The Papacy addresses its social Encyclicals to all people of good will, for
example, not just to people of Catholic faith.' 0 Some non-Catholic Christians respect
5 Catholic ecclesiological doctrine defines Papal primacy this way: "The Roman Pontiff, as the successor
of Peter, is the perpetual and visible principle and foundation of unity of both the bishops and of the
faithful." SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, LUMEN GENTIUM [DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH]
23 (1964). The First Vatican Council expressed the same idea in its own terms. See FIRST VATICAN
COUNCIL, AETERNUS PASTOR [FIRST DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH OF CHRIST] (1870). See
also ROBERT ENO, THE RISE OF THE PAPACY (1990) (illustrating the historical emergence of the Petrine
office).
6 The notion of "standing" in the formal legal sense reflects a common sense notion that a party with "a
sufficient personal concern" will more effectively litigate a matter. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 58 (4th ed. 2003).
7 Ratzinger Letter, supra note 1.
SId.
9 To extend the analogy of legal standing, one could say that the Church's interest in unity gives it
standing to raise such an interest on behalf of all those who likewise have an interest in unity but are too
scattered to raise it for themselves. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982)
(explicatingparenspatriae standing).
E.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS [PEACE ON EARTH] (1963) [hereinafter PACEM IN TERRIS]
(concluding the salutation commencing his encyclical letter, Pacem in Terris, with "and to all Men of Good
Will"). Pope Benedict XVI has said, "the Pope, in his capacity as Shepherd of his community, is also
increasingly becoming a voice for the ethical reasoning of humanity." Pope Benedict XVI, Lecture at the
University of Rome "La Sapienza" (Jan. 17, 2008) [hereinafter University of Rome "La Sapienza"],
available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedict-xvi/speeches/2008/january/documents/hf-ben-
xvi spe_20080117_la-sapienza en.html. See also Ian Fisher, University Protests in Rome Lead Pope to
Cancel Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008 (reporting that vociferous public opposition to the scheduled
lecture in a sector of the University community, based on a statement made by the Pope before assuming
his office in which he cited Paul Feyerabend in defense of at least certain aspects of the seventeenth-century
Church's handling of the Galileo Galilei case, led the Vatican to cancel this lecture).
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this role as ius humanum even when they do not as ius divinum. 11 The Papacy is not
the only religious office on the world scene able to assume this wider symbolic role,
as one can see merely by contemplating the significant role today of the Dalai
Lama. 12 By reason of its own self-concept, its very wide jurisdiction under Catholic
ecclesiastical law over large numbers of Catholics scattered around the world, and its
historic role within western civilization, the Papacy's adoption of this role, however,
has special functional or practical plausibility. 
13
b. Moral and Doctrinal Teacher
The Ratzinger letter acknowledges, in an implicit way at least, that the Papacy is
experiencing a challenge in being heard in its proclamation of Catholic and Christian
moral doctrine by reason of obstacles in the contemporary culture. The importance to
Catholicism of the Papal office and the proportionate scale, and distribution of
Catholicism globally makes this cultural impasse a benchmark for all other
institutions and associations concerned with moral values. 14 Ad intra, the Papacy, as
moral teacher, has standing to speak to Catholics wherever they are charged with
serving as teachers or researchers in areas relating to moral philosophy or theology. 15
1 Lutheran theologians have expressed the view that papal primacy could be entertained in functional
terms "relative or conditioned, dependent on the evangelical character of its exercise of the Petrine
ministry." George A. Lindbeck, Papacy and lus Divinum: A Lutheran View, in PAPAL PRIMACY AND THE
UNIVERSAL CHURCH 193, 199 (Paul C. Empie and T. Austin Murphy eds., 1974).
12 The editors of the volume Transforming Suffering: Reflections on Finding Peace in Troubled Times
place Pope John Paul II in parallel with the Dalai Lama. See Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, The
Transformation of Suffering, in TRANSFORMING SUFFERING: REFLECTIONS ON FINDING PEACE IN
TROUBLED TIMES 15, 15-17 (Donald E. Mitchell & James Wiseman, O.S.B. eds., 2003); Pope John Paul II,
The Meaning of Suffering, in TRANSFORMING SUFFERING: REFLECTIONS ON FINDING PEACE IN TROUBLED
TIMES, supra, at 27, 27-33. The book cites the Dalai Lama as saying the following about his own role: "I
believe that meetings between members of different spiritual traditions, exploring and sharing each other's
experiences, have the potential to make a real practical contribution to a greater peace and understanding in
our world. Everyone already knows my personal enthusiasm for this work, and I pray for the fruitful
success of this dialogue." Gyatso, supra, at 231.
13 The concrete institutional and jurisdictional elements giving the Catholic Church its global character as
a matter of its own internal structure can be seen in detail in the summary account of the geographical
distribution of its diverse administrative units provided in the Vatican's Annuario Pontificio (Pontifical
Yearbook). See, e.g., CITTA DEL VATICANO, ANNUARIO PONTIFICIO PER L'ANNO 1130-71 (2008)
(presenting the global geographical distribution of Roman Catholic Dioceses, Archdioceses, and other
administrative units for 2008). See also JOHN A. HARDON, S.J., MODERN CATHOLIC DICTIONARY 27
(1980) (explaining the Annuario Pontifico as the "official directory of the Roman Catholic Church"). The
results of the papal census of Roman Catholics for the Annuario Pontifico 2010 indicate that there are now
1.166 billion Catholics-meaning that Roman Catholics make up a little more than seventeen percent of the
world's population. See Number of Catholics Increases Worldwide: 2010 "Annuario" Shows Growth in
Asia and Africa, NEWS AGENCY ZENIT, Feb. 21, 2010, http://www.zenit.org/article-28425?l=English.
14 Extending the analogy to the legal doctrine of standing, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized concreteness of injury as an element of showing standing in the legal sense. See United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (holding that the
effect of increased freight rates on the freedom of members of the association to avail themselves of
outdoor recreational opportunities constituted the necessary concreteness of injury). Standing, moreover,
can be asserted on behalf of others if certain requisites are satisfied. See Barrows v. Jackson, 356 U.S. 249
(1953) (holding that a Caucasian who breached a restrictive racial covenant on a real estate deed had
standing to assert the rights of persons who were members of minority ethnic groups).
15 See, e.g., Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the
Theologian, 20 ORIGINS 117, 119-126 (1990). Joseph Komonchak comments on this Instruction,
describing it "as an effort, first, to validate the theological enterprise and, second, to distinguish between
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Ad extra, the Papacy is well positioned to speak as well to all those with parallel roles
in other cultural and religious traditions. 16 The difficulty that the Papacy faces in the
reception of its own teaching role gives it standing to speak to the concerns of moral
teachers, who, at any level, find themselves similarly situated.1
7
c. An Office in a System of Legal Governance
As an office of governance, the Papacy must concern itself, as a matter of its own
internal legal order, with the cultural and intercultural conditions for duly affirming
"the fundamental criteria for laws affecting the rights and duties of law"-i.e.,
precisely the point of concern on behalf of civil society within the Ratzinger
initiative. 18 For a century and more, the Papacy has sought to influence civil and
normal and even healthy tensions and illegitimate forms of dissent." Joseph A. Komonchak, The
Magisterium and Theologians, 29 CHICAGO STUDIES 307 (1990). He says that the document expresses "a
wider view which recognizes the whole Church as the primary bearer of Christ's message in and to the
world, and as the role of both theologian and Magisterium." Id; see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, SAPIENTIA
CHRISTIANA [APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION ON ECCLESIASTICAL UNIVERSITIES AND FACULTIES] (1979)
[hereinafter SAPIENTIA CHRISTIANA] (illustrating the Church's doctrinal position on the character of
universities with ecclesiastical faculties).
16 A helpful conceptual justification for the participation of the papacy in public discourse is the
following: "[T]here needs to be a place within public conversation and civic argument where matters of
human destiny can be debated and where the implications these matters have for the well-being of
individuals, institutions, society at large, the world community, and the planet we inhabit can be drawn out.
... [T]hose communities for which some form of religious ethics provides a reflective articulation of moral
vision and practice" can "serve as a model for public conversation on a matter upon which human
differences run deep, and to serve as such a model precisely by sustaining throughout it the 'openness to
mutual transformation."' Philip J. Rossi, S.J., Conflict, Community, and Human Destiny: Religion, Ethics,
Community and the Public Construction of Morality, in ETHICS, RELIGION, AND THE GOOD SOCIETY: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD (Joseph Runzo ed., 1992) (citing DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND
AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION AND HOPE 93, cf. 10-17, 98-99 (Harper & Row, 1987); David
Tracy, Christianity in the Wider Context: Demands and Transformations," in RELIGION AND
INTELLECTUAL LIFE 4:7-10 (1987)).
In his before-mentioned lecture intended for the University of Rome "La Sapienza," Pope Benedict XVI
finds support in John Rawls' concept of public reason for papal participation in public discourse. Pope
Benedict names Rawls' concession of a criterion of reasonableness "in the fact that such doctrines derive
from a responsible and well though-out tradition in which, over lengthy periods, satisfactory arguments
have been developed in support of the doctrines concerned." University of Rome "La Sapienza", supra
note 10. The Pope sums up his own view this way: "The Pope speaks as the representative of a community
of believers in which a particular wisdom about life has evolved in the course of the centuries of its
existence. He speaks as the representative of a community that preserves within itself a treasury of ethical
knowledge and experience important for all humanity: in this sense, he speaks as the representative of a
form of ethical reasoning." Id. Pope Benedict asks "What is a university?," and answers that "I think one
could say that at the most intimate level, the true origin of the university lies in the thirst for knowledge that
is proper to man. The human being wants to know what everything around him is. He wants truth." Id. He
also inquires: "What should the Pope do or say at the university? Certainly, he must not seek to impose the
faith upon others in an authoritarian manner - as faith can only be given in freedom. Over and above his
ministry as Shepherd of the Church, and on the basis of the intrinsic nature of this pastoral ministry, it is the
Pope's task to safeguard sensibility to the truth; to invite reason to set out ever anew in search of what is
true and good, in search of God; to urge reason, in the course of this search, to discern the illuminating
lights that have emerged during the history of the Christian faith, and thus to recognize Jesus Christ as the
Ligt that illumines history and helps us find the path towards the future." Id.
STo extend the legal standing metaphor, an association can assert standing on behalf of individual
members if it alleges, in part, the same kind of interest that would give them individual standing. Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (holding that an association can challenge a
state law restricting its constituents from labeling their produce effectively based on its own dedication as
an association precisely understanding and fostering effective marketing within the industry).
18 Ratzinger Letter, supra note 1. Pope John Paul II's comment in connection with the promulgation of
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international law through the promulgation of Catholic Social Thought. In doing so,
it has aimed at a societal reinforcement of the moral requisites of the Church's own
internal order, 19 The "obscuring" of moral knowledge that the Ratzinger initiative
cites as problem, therefore, has potential for affecting the Church as a body of
believers and as an institution.20 This vulnerability of the Catholic Church in its own
stability and good order lends credibility to the Papacy's standing to promote
discussion of the more general problem for society.21
d. Diplomatic Advocate for Human Rights and Welfare
The Papacy functions as a diplomatic observer on the world scene. In this role, it
receives information allowing it to learn almost uniquely about evolving social and
intellectual developments that have cross-cultural import for the moral health and
the Church's 1983 Code of Canon Law provides the Church's doctrinal view of the matter:
In actual fact the Code of Canon Law is extremely necessary for the Church. Since, indeed, [the
Church] is organized as a social and visible structure, it must also have norms: in order that its
hierarchical and organic structure be visible; in order that the exercise of the functions divinely
entrusted to [it], especially that of sacred power and of the administration of the sacraments, may be
adequately organized; in order that the mutual relations of the faithful may be regulated according to
justice based upon charity, with the rights of individuals guaranteed and well-defined; in order,
finally, that common initiatives, undertaken for a Christian life ever more perfect may be sustained,
strengthened and fostered by canonical norms.
POPE JOHN PAUL II, SACRAE DIsCIPLNAE LEGES [APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION FOR THE PROMULGATION OF
THE NEW CODE OF CANON LAW] (1983).19 Papal advocacy for an international human rights regime can be understood as having this two-sided
buttressing effect. Thus, Pope John XXIII addresses his encyclical, Pacem in Terris, both to "all men of
Good will" and to "the Clergy and Faithful of the entire Catholic World. " PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 10
(emphasis added). This pattern, beginning in 1963 with Pacem in Terris, continues to the present day. See,
e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS [ON THE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY] (1991) (addressing
this encyclical to "Venerable Brothers in the Episcopate" and to "to all men and women of good will"
among others).
20 Some social science studies suggest that there is a far-reaching dismissal of the Church doctrine on
morals and other matters among members of generations that have come of age after the Second Vatican
Council:
[R]eligious individualism is a revered part of the American experience. It has had a deep impact on
contemporary Catholicism. In the view of many young adult Catholics, being a Catholic is less a
matter of core identity and more a matter of personal option. These young adults are more
individualistic than ever, less inclined to go to church or to confession out of a sense of obligation,
less convinced that the Church's rules are God's rules, less convinced that the Church's structures are
divinely ordained or necessary, and more inclined to make choices for themselves. Young adults feel
at home in the Church insofar as they appropriate it on their own terms.
WILLIAM D. DINGES ET AL., YOUNG ADULT CATHOLICS: RELIGION IN THE CULTURE OF CHOICE 224-225
(2001). Another problem in the reception of teaching, which is disturbing on other grounds, has been
brought to mind through the recent public discussion of the clerical abuse of minors. See John Allen, Jr.,
Clergy Sexual Abuse in the American Catholic Church: The View From the Vatican, in SINS AGAINST THE
INNOCENTS: SEXUAL ABUSE BY PRIESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 13, 13-24 (Thomas G.
Plante ed., 2004) (providing an account of the Vatican's gradual growth in awareness of the scope and
nature of the problem).
21 To extend the analogy of legal standing, an organization has standing under law where a behavior
undermines the organization's ability to achieve its goals because of administrative disruption as
distinguished from a mere setback to the organization's abstract social interests. Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (holding that an association, which provided counseling and referral
services for low- and moderate-income home-seekers, had suffered an injury-in-fact through the "racial
steering" practices of real estate brokers).
human welfare of society.2 2 Its diplomatic mission permits the Church to receive and
to give early warning of pains and losses that societies are incurring in these areas
across cultures, political systems, and religions, which otherwise might too readily
evade notice among those closely experiencing them.23  The Vatican's unique
diplomatic informational base supplies credibility to the Papacy's standing to raise
questions based on factual assumptions regarding the global status of moral
discourse.
24
2. The Letter's Audience: The Academy
The Ratzinger letter states that the Congregation found it "necessary," upon the
conclusion of its own study of the matter, "to expand the scope of inquiry and involve
additional institutions," foremost among these, according to the letter's logic, Catholic
universities. 25  The letter's request is then structured in three steps: it frames the
question or problem for the academy's review; yields to the academy the question's
further exploration; and designates a third sector-the organs of public opinion, of
political decision, and of law-as ultimately the forum to which the academy's
insights are to be directed for their most critical application.
Cardinal Ratzinger names, as the question that the Academy is asked to address,
society's critical need for a renewal of its sources of insight into certain "natural
moral truths regarding, for example, respect for human life and the transmission of
life within marriage, human love, family rights, social justice and freedom," for the
sake of grounding "the fundamental criteria for laws affecting the rights and duties of
all."26  He describes the situation of one "obscuring" truths for "centuries .. .
unquestioned ethical principles for the life of society," by reason, at least, in part of
"contemporary difficulties" society now experiences in "grasping the necessity and
value of the philosophical basis of ethics." 
27
22 The diplomatic role of the Church in this regard has been analyzed this way: the transnational structure
of the Roman Catholic Church "have begun to play more specialized roles in aggregating demands and
giving normative support for universal human values." Ivan Vallier, The Roman Catholic Church: A
Transnational Actor, 25 INT'L ORG. 479, 499 (1971). As an early twentieth-century example, one can
name the role of Catholic diplomatic organizations working in tacit unison with the Holy See in supplying
the League of Nations with "documents and statistics" from different national perspectives on the questions
of concern to the League regarding "the protection of children and the suppression of obscenity, drugs, the
traffic in women, and slavery." ROBERT JOHN ARAUJO, S.J. & JOHN A. LUCAL, S.J., PAPAL DIPLOMACY
AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE: THE VATICAN AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FROM THE EARLY YEARS
TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 225, 229 (2004).
23 This international perspective also can help the Church to understand signs of change called for within
its own order. "[T]he different attitudes towards the Church and the papacy[,] which [Angelo Roncalli] had
encountered in Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, [and] the problems and difficulties of French Catholics" that
he encountered as a papal diplomat, shaped his decision to convene the Second Vatican Council as Pope
John XII. J. DEREK HOLMES, THE PAPACY IN THE MODERN WORLD 201 (1981).24 Again, with analogy to the doctrine of standing in law, standing on the part of an association to assert
the interests of its constituents may be based in part on its having "engaged in ... research and analysis,
public education campaigns, and scientific research" in the area of their common interest. See Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977).
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He goes on to sketch a variety of deep-seated causative trends behind this decline.
Several of them are intellectual: i.e., a "rupture between the ratio functionalis of the
natural sciences and the ratio ethica" with a consequent "divergence between the
empirical sciences ...and philosophy and theology;" an "extensive and complex
semantic range" in the current use of "the concept of 'nature;' and the prevalence of
"agnosticism and relativism." 28 And, others are extrinsic or sociological: "rapid
social change;" "processes of modernization and technological advances;" "formative
influence of the mass media on culture and popular opinion;" and "pluralism and
multiculturalism characteristic of many countries." 29
His letter sketches several concrete steps as elements in what he presumes to be the
solution to this problem. He names, for example, the overcoming of "contemporary
difficulties in grasping the necessity and value of the philosophical basis of ethics;" a
renewed ecumenical unity among Christian churches, founded on "deeper [common]
understanding of the theology of creation, as this flows from the unity of God's
salvific plan in Christ" and Christian unity regarding "the ethical requirements that
derive from the constitution of the human person as created by God" and
"intercultural and interreligious" consensus based on a correlation of diverse concepts
"equivalent to one or more aspects of the natural law"; Cardinal Ratzinger envisions
this final element of dialogue as occurring between a putatively Christian Europe and
Western Hemisphere and a tacitly non-Christian Africa and Asia, "'interpreting and
defining the values rooted in the very nature of the human person' and mutually
"beneficial for all parties" without any imposition by Christianity.
30
The distinctive task that the letter then yields to the Academy is the search for
"deeper understanding" of the problem, and "currents and points of agreement ...
productive [for] renewing ... philosophical and theological reflection" and inspiring
"ecumenical, interreligious and intercultural encounters" that he sketches as
presumptively curative of it.3t The letter assigns this investigation to the Academy
with the understanding that its results will have their primary application in yet
another sector-i.e., the organs of public opinion, political decision, and law. The
academic work, which Cardinal Ratzinger's initiative means to elicit, has a relevance
going beyond either the internal compass of academic debate or its value for
prospective doctrinal pronouncements or other initiatives by the Papacy. It is
foreseen as in the service of society in its attempts to settle the "fundamental criteria




30 Id. (quoting POPE JOHN PAUL 11, NoVO MILLENNIO INEUNTE 51 (2001)).
31 Id. The initiative asks each university to undertake a study of"some aspect of this question." Id. The
present collection limits itself to "philosophical and theological reflection" and "ecumenical, interreligious
and intercultural encounters." Id. The Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture selected these aspects of
the question from among all of those named in the Ratzinger Letter, as broad enough and as being, without
more, amenable to coherent development. Elements that the Letter cited but are not included here are, for




The outreach of Cardinal Ratzinger to the Academy in this initiative presupposes
the relationship between the Church and its universities, envisioned under the relevant
doctrinal framework propounded by the contemporary Catholic Church. At the same
time, it reflects a more distinctive conception of that role, originating more personally
with Joseph Ratzinger. 33 This conception, was formed undoubtedly in Ratzinger's
history first as a University Professor, and then as Prefect for the Sacred Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith. 3 Benedict's personal synthesis appears more in
evidence in his official pronouncements in the setting of his pontificate than it did as
he carried out his role as the Prefect for the Sacred Congregation of the Doctrine of
the Faith.35 One well known example of its appearance is in his dialogue as Pope
with philosopher JUrgen Habermas, resulting in a co-authored published work.36
Another is seen in his dialogue with Jewish theologian Jacob Neusner over Jewish
and Catholic perspectives on the significance of Jesus of Nazareth.37 In pursuit of this
conception, he accepted an invitation to address the University of Rome "La
Sapienza" on the topic, originally scheduled for January 17, 2008.38 The cancellation
of the lecture after demonstrations in opposition is a reminder that Pope Benedict's
vision of the Church's relationship with the Academy has at times been "a sign of
contradiction," as the panel, "Pope Benedict XVI and the Desideratum of Nature
Law," below begins to address.
39
33 Cf SAPIENTIA CHRISTIANA, supra note 15; JOHN PAUL II, Ex CORDE ECCLESIAE [APOSTOLIC
CONSTITUTION ON CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES] (1990).
34 See JOHN L. ALLEN, JR., THE RISE OF BENEDICT XVI 149-52, 154-61 (2005).
35 One can compare, for example, his well known Instruction as Prefect, Instruction on Certain Aspects
of the "Theology of Liberation", 14 ORIGINS 193-204 (1984), with his dialogue among Catholic
universities as Pontiff:
In regard to faculty members at Catholic colleges universities, I wish to reaffirm the great value of academic
freedom. In virtue of this freedom you are called to search for the truth wherever careful analysis of evidence leads
you. Yet it is also the case that any appeal to the principle of academic freedom in order to justify positions that
contradict the faith and the teaching of the Church would obstruct or even betray the university's identity and
mission; a mission at the heart of the Church's munus docendi and not somehow autonomous or independent of it.
Pope Benedict XVI, Address to Catholic Educators at The Catholic University of America (Apr. 17, 2008),
in 37 Origins 741, 744 (2008).
36 See Virgil Nemoianu, The Church and the Secular Establishment: A Philosophical Dialogue Between
Joseph Ratzinger and Jirgen Habermas, 9 LOGOS, Spring 2006, at 17, 17-42. This dialogue, originally a
public exchange sponsored by the Bavarian Catholic Academy in Munich on January 19, 2004, with the
title Vorpolitische moralische Grundlagen einesfreiheitlichen Staates, was later published as a book. See
JOSEPH RATZINGER AND JUERGEN HABERMAS, THE DIALECTICS OF SECULARIZATION: ON REASON AND
RELIGION (2007).
37 Even as Pontiff, Pope Benedict XVI responds, in academic terms, not in terms of the teaching
authority of his office, to Jacob Neusner's theological analysis, in A Rabbi Talks to Jesus, of the
representation of Jesus as teacher in the Gospel of Matthew. POPE BENEDICT XVI, JESUS OF NAZARETH
69, 103-123 (2007). See JACOB NEUSNER, A RABBI TALKS TO JESUS (2000). Rabbi Neusner responds to
Pope Benedict in an interview with Andrea Monda. See The Pope at the Synagogue? An Important Event,
L'OSSERVATORIo ROMANO, Jan. 27, 2010, at 6.
38 Fisher, supra note 10.
39 James Schall, S.J., David Solomon & William Wagner, Pope Benedict XVI and the Desideratum of a
Natural Law: Three Views, post, p. 63 [hereinafter Desideratum of a Natural Law].
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B. The Catholic University ofAmerica's Response
The Ratzinger letter aims at eliciting an original and distinctive response from each
university that it addresses. As just one example, one can consider the University of
Notre Dame's option of producing a volume of essays exploring the philosophy of
Alasdair MacIntyre whose themes intersect with the letter's subject matter.4 ° Quite
apart from the substantive results of its inquiry, each participating university is called
by the letter to account for the structure and method that has determined the character
of the work it has produced. This is so because the quest for a suitable academic
methodology for uncovering academically sound responses to the initiative's concerns
is one of the initiative's central objectives. The character of that methodology will
hardly be obvious in advance, in view of the "contemporary difficulties" that Cardinal
Ratzinger's letter states are "not absent" even "from the teaching.., in Catholic
universities," "obscuring" relevant insight. 41 The gravity of the question within the
letter's schema is clear, since it notes that "the destiny of human beings and the future
of civilization" hangs in the balance.
42
At The Catholic University of America, the Center for Law, Philosophy and
Culture ("the Center")43 was entrusted with the responsibility of deciding the further
details of the University's response to Cardinal Ratzinger's request for action. The
distinctive structure and method that the Center brought to this assignment is,
historically speaking, what The Catholic University of America can now offer for
future, potential emulation by others. The Center's basic purpose and the goals
dovetailed well with those of the papal initiative. Its purpose was, namely, to advance
"theoretical understandings of law's relation to human culture and the human good,"
with the further objective of "the renewal and transformation of culture through
practical insight into the relation of law and legal institutions to the human good
under contemporary circumstances."
44
40 INTRACTABLE DISPUTES ABOUT THE NATURAL LAW: ALASDAIR MACINTYRE AND CRITICS (Lawrence
S. Cunningham ed., 2009). Other examples include The Catholic University of East Africa's The First
CUEA International Symposium: Natural Law, convened in Nairobi, Kenya on February 6-8, 2007, and
The Pontifical Lateran University's International Congress on Natural Law, held in Rome, Italy on
February 12, 2007.
41 Ratzinger Letter, supra note 1.
42 Id.
43 Since fall 2009, the Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture has also offered a curricular component
within the Law School for law students in the form of a Certificate of Studies in Jurisprudence. See Center
of Law, Philosophy and Culture, Certificate of Studies in Jurisprudence,
htV://cpc.cua.edu/about/programs/certificate.cfm (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
See Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture, Statement of Purpose,
http://clpc.cua.edu/about/statementofpurpose.cfin (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). Examples of
interdisciplinary symposia organized by the Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture include: The Nature of
Judicial Authority: A Reflection on Philip Hamburger's Law and Judicial Duty (Apr. 8-9, 2010); Steven D.
Smith's Law Quandary, The Perplexity is Metaphysical: An Inquiry in Law and Literature: Equity and
'Exceptionalism' in Anglo-American Literature (Jan. 4-5, 2006); Ethics, Public Policy and Law: The Stem
Cell Debate in the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany (Oct. 4-5, 2004); Law,
Culture and the Catholic University (Mar. 15-16, 2004); Diverse Visions in American Health Care:
Conflict, Conscience and the Law (Apr. 2-4, 2003); The Rule of Law in the Information Age: Reconciling
Private Rights and Public Interest, (Oct. 9-10, 2002); The Idea of Public Reason: Achievement or Failure?
(May 15-16, 2001); The Morality of the Death Penalty: The Challenge for Law, Society and Religion (Mar.
29-30, 2001); A Comparative Law Colloquium: The Value of Free Speech and Its Reasoned Limits In the
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The Center's purpose oriented it to research into the cultural prerequisites and
potential of seeking the common human good, by and under law. The Center,
therefore, sponsored: theological and philosophical research into the nature and
meaning of human fulfillment; research in the humanities, more generally, into the
good of human experience and expression; research in the social sciences into the
function of human social institutions and practices; and research in law into the
requisites of a just and equitable legal ordering of society. The test of the success of
its work, obviously enough, is the integration of these disciplines in a single
conversation.
Two principles combine to provide the key to the Center's method for integrating
these disciplines within such a common conversation. One of these principles is that
unity is to be sought according to the Anselmian postulate offides querens intellectum
(faith seeking understanding).45 Citing the encyclical Fides et Ratio, the Ratzinger
initiative affirms that it rests upon this same fundamental intellectual orientation.
46
Faith that common understanding is ultimately possible holds the place for a
conversation among disciplines that do not share common disciplinary
methodological postulates on a topic that exceeds any of their individual scope.
Constitutional Systems of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany (May 15,
2000); Jubilee Year Reflections on Catholic Social Thought: Anticipating the Kingdom (Mar. 16-17, 2000);
and Approaches in Religious Law and Practice (Nov. 15-16, 1999).
Lecturers in the Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture's lecture series, Lectures in Law, Philosophy and
Religious Traditions, include: Oliver O'Donovan, University of Edinburgh, Lecture on Law's Place in the
Order of Creation (Sept. 2, 2010); Joseph Vining, University of Michigan Law School, Emeritus, Lecture
on The Consequence of Human Differences (Nov. 11, 2009); Joseph Weiler, New York University, Lecture
on On the Question of Nomos, Prayer, and Love: An Anti-Antinomean Approach (Apr. 7, 2008); Jeremy
Waldron, New York University, Lecture on What Can Christian Argument Add to the Case Against Torture
(Mar. 27, 2007); John Witte, Jr., Emory University Law School, Lecture on Ishmael's Bane: The
Illegitimacy of the Doctrine of Bastardy (Feb. 23, 2006); John T. Noonan, Jr., United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, Emeritus,
Lecture on Papal Jurisdiction over Nonbelievers: The Marriage Cases (Mar. 7, 2005); W. Michael Reisman,
Yale University Law School, Lecture on Anatomy of a Love-Hate Relation: America and International
Organizations (Nov. 6, 2003); Guido Calabresi, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
Yale University Law School, Lecture on An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law (Oct.
4, 2003); John Gardner, Oxford University, Lecture on The Moral Priority of Strict Criminal Liability
(Sept. 25, 2003); Charles Donohue, Jr., Harvard University Law School, Lecture on A Crisis of Law?:
Reflections on the Church and the Law over the Centuries (Feb. 4, 2003); J.G.A. Pocock, Johns Hopkins
University, Lecture on History, Enlightenment and the Sovereignty of States (Oct. 23, 2002); John Haldane,
University of St. Andrews, Lecture on Society, Education and the Practice of Wisdom (Mar. 19, 2002);
Jean Bethke Elshtain, University of Chicago Divinity School, Lecture on Why Augustine? Why Now? (Jan.
22, 2002); Harold Berman, Emory University Law School and Harvard University Law School, Emeritus,
Lecture on The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Traditions (Feb. 12, 2001);
R.H. Helmholz, University of Chicago Law School, Lecture on The Problem of Basic Human Rights: The
Perspective of the Classical Canon Law (Oct. 16, 2000); and Kenneth Pennington, Syracuse University
Law School, Lecture on Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Origins of a Legal Maxim (Nov. 19, 1999).
45 The concept, of course, goes back to St. Augustine, who framed it as crede ut intellegas. 2 LExIKON
FOR THEOLOGIE UND KIRCHE 1344 (1994) (stating from St. Augustine's sermon 43, 9: "ergo intellege ut
credas, crede ut intellegas"), and to St. Anselm, who also frames it as credo ut intellectum. ST. ANSELM,
Proslogium or Discourse on the Knowledge of God, in ST. ANSELM BASIC WRITINGS 53 (S.N. Deane
trans., 2d. ed. 1992) ("For this also I believe,-that unless I believed, I should not understand.").
46 In Fides et Ratio, the principle is framed this way: "The intellect must seek that which it loves: the
more it loves, the more it desires to know." POPE JOHN PAUL IH, FIDES ET RATIO [ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON] 42 (1998).
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Viewpoints can then be related in a dialectic that enjoys coherence in relation to the
kinds of horizons articulated by Bernard Lonergan.
47
The second principle that is key to the Center's integration of disciplines is an
interdisciplinary conversation in the Center that finds a concrete anchor in some
reference to law or public policy. The Center raised theoretical questions about the
the common good or law as these arise abstractly as a matter of philosophy or
political theory or in relation to scriptural or theological motifs, wherever possible
with some at least indirect reference to law or policy. In doing so, the Center linked
its conversations to two sources of basic meaning available across disciplines. First, it
related discussion to the moral authority arising inherently through practical decision
for the good of the community. Second, it offered participants legal method as a
grammar for an integrative statement of issues crossing academic disciplines. In both
respects, each discipline is enabled to introduce its version of deliberative reason into
a discussion, thus, sharing an inherent intelligibility not dependent upon the
disciplines' affirmance of one another's internal criteria. Within legal studies, the
Center's methodology introduces, reciprocally, the theory of the humanistic
disciplines, beginning with philosophy and theology, specifically for the sake of its
appropriation within the law's characteristic form of concern for meaning and value. 48
It would be quite unrealistic to suppose that the work envisioned in the Ratzinger
initiative could be carried out by an ad hoc interdepartmental University committee.
The trend of ever-increasing differentiation and specialization at the contemporary
university imposes powerfully dispersive forces interfering with the capacity of the
University's schools and departments, on an ad hoc basis without more, to conduct
the integrative work the Ratzinger initiative envisions.
49
47 The concept of method pursued here draws on Bernard Lonergan's schema. See BERNARD
LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 3-146 (University of Toronto Press 2003). More specifically, the
Center of Law, Philosophy and Culture's multidisciplinary concentration draws on Lonergan's notion of
"dialectic as method." Id. at 251-53. In this dimension of investigation, the researcher sees that positions
are stated and compared as compatible or without intellectual, moral and spiritual conversion, and develops
them by an integration of further data. Id. By contrast, one can imagine altogether different models for the
integration of knowledge that might be proposed at a contemporary university which would not work to
advance the vision of integration in the Ratzinger initiative. Where these embody utilitarianism, modernist
compartmentalization, or post-modem skepticism, their adoption would obviously be self-defeating for that
purpose.
The commitment is explicitly at The Catholic University of America as a matter of the Law School's
founding. The study of law at the Catholic University of America has, namely, been envisioned as
encompassing theoretically oriented advanced inquiry contributing to a holistic grasp of human values since
its founding as a faculty in 1895-being elevated from faculty to school in 1897-by William Callyhan
Robinson, Catholic convert, and, formerly, professor of law at Yale Law School. William Callyhan
Robinson, LL.D., 21 YALE L.J. 237 (1912). See also A Study on Legal Education: Its Purposes and
Methods, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN (1895) (presenting William Callyhan Robinson's inaugural
account of his program for legal education); Joseph Nuesse, The Thrust of Legal Education at the Catholic
University of America, 1895-1954 , 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 33, 38 (1985) (citing founding dean William
Callyhan Robinson 's intention to create a approach to legal studies better integrated into University studies
than the legal education found at other universities with existing programs, which he described as "quite
elementary, mainly practical, and generally bestowed on men who have little knowledge of philosophy or
any other of the subjects").
For one description of the trend, consider the following:
How did we get into this situation, in which universities fail to connect with people's most urgent
questions? ... But first let us grant the simple effects of size and specialization. Departments keep
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Particular schools and departments within a university are generally not equipped
to cultivate the motivation, distinctive purpose, or academic expertise for the relevant
work because they necessarily conceive of their work within separate specialized and
differentiated spheres. Their dedication to their separate spheres and their need to
compete for resources in the zero-sum game of campus allocations pulls them away
from attention to the requirements of common integrative work. In addition, the
cultural "difficulties" that the Ratzinger initiative cites as obscuring the integrative
pursuit of truth also affect Catholic universities, immersed as they are in the general
culture, so that culturally-regnant positivism and relativism become more convenient,
and, for some participants, perhaps even more congenial. 50 As a result, purely intra-
subdividing as we learn more. The scale of universities is so vast that they become worlds unto
themselves-academic ghettos. We talk only to others within our specialty, and may have trouble
doing even that. Faculty members who take their turn on grant committees often shake their heads
over the research proposals they must read from alien departments .... We can't just ignore the
explosion of knowledge and information that we have to deal with these days. Increasingly,
administrators worry that the training we give at the university becomes obsolete so rapidly. The
degrees they award mean less as the useful life of "information" shrinks.
C. JOHN SOMMERVILLE, THE DECLINE OF THE SECULAR UNIVERSITY 9 (2006). Pope Benedict XVI names the cultural
loss of conviction of "the objective," which could anchor movement counter to the direction of
disintegration, as a decisive cause of the dispersive effects of differentiation:
When nothing beyond the individual is recognized as definitive, the ultimate criterion of judgment
becomes the self and the satisfaction of the individual's immediate wishes. The objectivity and
perspective, which can only come through a recognition of the essential transcendent dimension of
the human person, can be lost. Within such a relativistic horizon the goals of education are inevitably
curtailed. Slowly, a lowering of standards occurs. We observe today a timidity in the face of the
category of the good and an aimless pursuit of novelty parading as the realization of freedom. We
witness an assumption that every experience is of equal worth and a reluctance to admit imperfection
and mistakes.
Pope Benedict XVI, Address to Catholic Educators at The Catholic University of America (Apr. 17, 2008),
in 37 Origins 741, 743 (2008). Essentially the same point has been made by Sommerville:
But why talk only about information? One no longer hears administrators giving talks on "wisdom,"
an old-fashioned word meaning seeing things in their widest context, including our ultimate
concerns. . . . [T]here is something besides size and specialization that is undermining the
universities. They have also lost touch with important questions by their secularization. Important
questions seem to involve "ultimate" values and standards of reference.
SOMMERVILLE, supra, at 9-10. See also GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY:
FROM PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF (1994) (providing a historical account
of the secularization of the University questioned by Sommerville). Pope Benedict seeks to advance what
is the Church's proposed remedy to the problem and with it the living impulse of the Center of Law,
Philosophy and Culture:
But a University, and especially a Catholic University, "has to be a 'living union' of individual
organisms dedicated to the search for truth ... It is necessary to work towards a higher synthesis of
knowledge, in which alone lies the possibility of satisfying that thirst for truth which is profoundly
inscribed on the heart of the human person" (footnote omitted). Aided by the specific contributions
of philosophy and theology, university scholars will be engaged in a constant effort to determine the
relative place and meaning of each of the various disciplines within the context of a vision of the
human person and the world that is enlightened by the Gospel, and therefore by a faith in Christ, the
Logos, as the centre of creation and of human history. . . . While each discipline is taught
systematically and according to its own methods, interdisciplinary studies, assisted by a careful and
thorough study of philosophy and theology, enable students to acquire an organic vision of reality
and to develop a continuing desire for intellectual progress. In the communication of knowledge,
emphasis is then placed on how human reason in its reflection opens to increasingly broader
questions, and how the complete answer to them can only come from above through faith.
Ex CORDE ECCLESIAE, supra note 33, at 16, 20.
50 See Desideratum of a Natural Law, supra note 39, at 66-67 (presenting David Solomon's reservations
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departmental focus and energy is insufficient to tilt the balance against the dispersive
effects of specialization and differentiation. The Center, by virtue of its character
advanced, in workable terms, true cross-disciplinary work. As a consequence, it was
situated as a kind of lever or fulcrum enabling a flow of focus and energy favoring
collaborative integrative efforts among the diverse constituencies of its university,
sufficient to overcome all countervailing inertial forces in the direction of separation
and dispersal of energy.
The Center functioned by offering a "second-order" vantage from which to
interpret, apply, and supplement the first-order work of particular schools and
departments, with the result that that work may be taken up within the channels of a
common integrative endeavor.5 1 Just as it would be an error to suppose that the
separate schools and departments can replicate this integrative function separately, it
would be an error to think that such a center can fulfill this function as some kind of
extrinsic, purely administrative "outside consultant." It functions effectively within is
assigned role only because it possesses the cumulative substantive knowledge and
skill required to advance genuine integrative understanding. Its niche permits it to
accumulate and perfect this knowledge in a way not open to individual schools and
departments "caught" in their first-order disciplinary tracks. It conducts its work in
reliance on its director and other scholars who possess advanced degrees in more than
one core discipline or who work in teams in which close-enough working harmony
achieves a fusion of expertise across disciplines. It regularly convenes carefully-
constituted and adequately-grounded expert planning groups with requisite joint
knowledge across disciplines. It has established consultative relationships with many
individual scholars and other experts with substantive knowledge concerning
problems recurring in the Center's coordination of multidisciplinary work.
Schools and departments are organized around the maintenance of a set number of
faculty lines; the satisfaction of standing curricular requirements; and the conferral of
degrees attesting to disciplinary competency. As a consequence, their activities flow,
over time, in relatively fixed channels of scholarly discourse and administrative
decision-making. They, thus, are unable to muster the energy or directionality
required for true cross-disciplinary integrative projects that both the Ratzinger
initiative and the charter of Catholic universities as illumined by Ex corde ecclesiae
deem to be not only valid and legitimate but necessary. A multidisciplinary center
like the Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture, by contrast, from its inception, is a
vehicle suited to such work. It is constructed around the requisite motivation and
sense of purpose. Its structure equips it to secure and retain the distinctive knowledge
needed for its task; to aggregate the stable of professional relationships crossing
about the good faith of the pervasive university culture).
51 John Henry Newman describes this second-order perspective this way: "And further, the
comprehension of the bearings of one science on another, and the use of each to each, and the location and
limitation and adjustment and due appreciation of them all, one with another, this belongs, I conceive, to a
sort of science distinct from all of them, and in some sense a science of sciences." JOHN HENRY NEWMAN,
THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY 57 (Oxford University Clarendon Press 1976) (1899).
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ordinary administrative boundaries within a university and beyond it;52 and to strike
an efficient and fair balance in allocating costs and benefits among participants across
its evolving projects.5 3 So constituted, the Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture of
52 The Center of Law, Philosophy and Culture, thus, enjoys a working rapport with a network of scholars
at the home university and across many other universities, even internationally, within relationships formed
over time by way of these scholars' substantive academic contributions to particular Center projects and
their ongoing individual consultation on various Center matters. The Center cultivates such rapport within
both the higher and lateral administrative structures of its university in order to foster the communication
and efficient administrative decision-making that is needed to advance participation in Center projects by
scholars' schools and departments. It cherishes such rapport with administrative staff within the law school
and different university sectors. At this level, the fuller texture of relevant concretized knowledge is
transmitted.
In this latter realm, specific acknowledgements are in order with respect to those whose contributions
made the present collection possible. First, the Center's thanks go to Constantia Dedoulis whose creative
imprint and record of resourcefulness runs throughout the entire narrative embodied in footnote 45 above
like a golden thread and, with her, to Margaret Pooley whose like stamp is very much evident on the events
of the last three years. Then, I wish warmly to thank Janelle Salamon, my former administrative assistant,
now a law student at nearby American University, who skillfully gathered all the manuscripts in this
particular proceeding-at times by arduous transcription-into the initial compilation that preceded this
published journal issue as a gift to the Journal's very able student editorial board and staff. Next, I would
wish to mention, with gratitude, Mary Dodson, who has artfully arranged the travel and accommodation of
over two hundred scholars participating in Center events over the years. I also wish to make special
mention of the exceptional assistance of Joan Vorrasi, William Jonas, and their staffs, including Brandon
Pettit, for orchestrating so deftly all the complex planning of the use of facilities and providing food and
refreshment for visiting scholars and often very large audiences-here special mention must be made of
Joan Vorrasi's exquisite judgment and care in attention to detail. Nor can one leave out warm thanks for
the wonderful and very extensive creative work of the members of our graphic designers and public
relations and publications staff: Lara Frederickson, Donna Hobson, Carol Casey, and Victor Nakas must be
mentioned with gratitude. The Center is indebted to Lara Frederickson for her sublime design of both all
the symposium publicity centering on art from the Dome of Creation, Cathedral of San Marco, Venice,
Italy and her beautiful design of the Center's current web page. Likewise, the skillful assistance with
information technology of Edward Trudeau, Dustin White, Juanita Glenn, and William Lantry deserve
heartfelt mention. Not least, I would like to thank with special warmth Gayle Campbell and Paula
Blackwell for their exceptional assistance in accounting for the expenses in connection with the
symposium. The Center also wishes to thank many other staff members whose work cannot be mentioned
here, but which was equally essential.
The life force of the Center is manifest in relationships which it fosters with interested professional and
graduate students, for, as volunteers and paid interns, these students perform key academic and quasi-
academic functions in the course of the work. Here, I would like to thank in particular Jonathan Watson,
Emily Khoury, Lauren Brannon, Maggie Datiles, Michael O'Brien, and Daniel Marcinek for their very kind
assistance. In the context of the present collection, such a debt is to be acknowledged with keenest
gratitude to the student Board of Editors and Staff of the Journal (a co-faculty-student edited publication)
listed on the masthead above for their preparing the present body of work for publication, as they with great
skill and much tireless labor have played the most decisive role of all in accounting for the appearance of
the present volume.
Finally, the symposium was made possible with very generous gifts from several donors. The Center,
therefore, wishes with very warm thanks to acknowledge the generous support of The William E. Simon
Foundation, Our Sunday Visitor Institute, the John McGonigle Charitable Trust, and the Marriott
International Corporation. Particular thanks go to Our Sunday Visitor Institute for its unbroken support
through a number of grants over the life of the Center that have substantially advanced its coming into
existence. The tireless work of Tracy Dowling and Robert Sullivan of the University Development office,
which facilitated such sponsorship, is also warmly acknowledged.
53 In contrast to the school or department, the Center must advance a common good defined by the
intersecting ends of individual and institutional contributors including: the ultimate academic purpose of the
particular project; the underlying founding purposes of the University and of the interdisciplinary center in
question; the motivating purposes of any co-sponsor, like Cardinal Ratzinger in the present case; the
individual academic benefits leading each academic participant to take part; and the academic ends of each
campus school or department contributing project resources. Again, in contrast to the school or
department, the Center must coordinate means effectively, against this same backdrop of shifting ends.
Flaws that enter the work on this level can readily result in a project failing to reach the critical threshold
for creating substantively worthwhile work.
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The Catholic University of America produced a symposium, entitled "A Common
Morality for the Global Age: In Gratitude for What We Are Given" and held on
March 27 - 30, 2008, answering to the initiative of Cardinal Ratzinger's letter to the
University of October 27, 2004. It is this symposium that has yielded the collection
of essays below. In carrying out this work, the Center was pleased that it catalyzed
the enrichment and the renewal of local community on the University campus
dedicated to the themes of Cardinal Ratzinger's initiative. Many consultations with
faculty experts across campus preceded the symposium. Two of the symposium's
plenary papers and nine of its responses or panel presentations were written by
members of The Catholic University of America faculty. The Center was no less
delighted to have contributed to the University's being, for the time, the hub of a
larger world-wide university without walls. Numerous off-campus experts graciously
consulted during the planning phase, and twenty-one plenary speakers travelled to the
University from within the United States and from abroad to deliver the papers that
now appear here as articles, as did, as well, fifteen scholars serving as respondents
and panelists. A diverse and lively audience of six hundred audience members, both
from on and off campus and from the United States and from other countries, came
together for the four-day symposium. The hope now is that in the course of
considering the essays that follow, readers may be inspired by it to build a parallel
community of discourse wherever they find themselves in venues across the country
and around the world.
II. The Essays
As Cardinal Ratzinger's initiative fans out to include its more particular concerns, it
implies at its core a unifying thesis. The present collection of essays takes seriously
the initiative's diverse particular concerns but does so with attention to an organic
unity deriving from this more fundamental thesis. To this extent, this collection
represents what is admittedly an interpretation-hopefully creative--of the request
found within Cardinal Ratzinger's initiative. The collection states what it infers of
this thesis in light of terms suggested by C.S. Lewis in The Abolition of Man.5 4 This
reliance does not seem to be altogether daring, as Cardinal Ratzinger himself adopts
Lewis' thesis elsewhere. 55  Cardinal Angelo Scola, a moral philosopher and
In attending both to ends and means, once again in contrast to the school or department, the Center must
track variables to ensure balance of fairness among participants in relationships and ad hoc projects
crossing beyond ordinary university channels. Sensitivity is called for respecting the tally of true costs and
benefits across all participants-which is easily missed-and the just and creative measure of distribution.
54 C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (HarperCollins 2001) (1944).
55 JOSEPH RATZINGER, TURNING POINT FOR EUROPE?: THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD
ASSESSMENT AND FORECAST 29 (Brian McNeil trans., 1994). Pope John Paul 11 also acknowledged such a
cultural transmission of moral wisdom discerning at its core an implicit acknowledgement of God as the
foundation at the root of the possibility of morally good action, for God "has already given an answer to
[the question of the good] ... by creating man and ordering him with wisdom and love to his final end,




theologian and patriarch of Venice, conveniently paraphrases Lewis' thesis as the
authors had it before them in his own essay, as follows:
The attitude that was so dear to Lewis, an attitude of respect and gratitude for what has
been given, an attitude that is proper to each person towards the inheritance of practical
wisdom, which all traditions and cultures in very part of the globe have preserved for the
great chain of the generations .... According to this thesis, which had already been
formulated by Benedict XVI in Deus Caritas Est, our existence is illuminated on the
historical and cultural level by a common normative "natural" patrimony, susceptible of
being made the foundation for a non-deductivist conception of natural law, whether it be
of a cosmological, biological, or rationalistic sort.56
All of the authors in the collection had this Lewis thesis as one starting point for
reflection, as they turned to thinking about their individual topics. The goal was to
instill an orientation in the collection as a whole to the more organic sweep to what is
taken to be Ratzinger's vision,57 and to invite the authors to relate their particular
topics to some more holistic vision of the problem whether confirmatory of, or in any
way in counterpoint to, the Lewis thesis. Each author accepted, as narrower topic,
some aspect of one of the particular concerns to which the Ratzinger alludes: i.e., 1)
the necessity and value of the philosophical basis of ethics; 2) ecumenical unity
among Christian churches on the question of moral truth; 3) agreement on moral
principle through "intercultural and interreligious" dialogue; or 4) "fundamental
criteria for laws affecting the rights and duties of all" as a matter of public policy,
political decision and lawmaking. Each author then developed that particular topic
with an implicit orientation to, in some way, confirming, qualifying, or perhaps even
rejecting the larger C.S. Lewis thesis.
The result is a very rich body of work. The collection covers a great deal of ground
on a complex array of themes from a number of different angles. An academic
introduction may be undertaken in a number of ways. The present one, in the section
that remains, seeks to offer a chart of the viewpoints ahead as well as of the contours
of the discussion among these viewpoints taking shape as the this collection is
considered as a whole. By delineating these pathways, the introduction seeks to assist
readers from diverse backgrounds, both on an initial exposure to this material and,
upon subsequent re-readings should these occur in the years to come, for the sake of a
more adequate grasp of the distinctive contributions of the different authors and of the
many interconnections that may be made among their work from diverse disciplinary
and faith perspectives.
56 Angelo Scola, The Light of Moral Insight, post, pp. 71, 73.
5 See generally JOSEPH RATZINGER, VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL (2006) (exploring the role of a
reconciliation of faith and reason in finding an adequate response to current threats to the good of
humanity); JOHN L. ALLEN, JR., THE RISE OF BENEDICT XVI 165-198 (2005) (setting out Pope Benedict's
call for a response, both on the level of ideas and of politics, to the cultural problem of a "dictatorship of
relativism" in both the United States and Europe).
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A. Agreeing on the Context for the Question - Preliminary Issues
Two panel conversations open the collection, each seeking to name core
considerations basic to orienting the reader to the collection's essential significance.
One panel, entitled "Avenues of Reflection: Opening the Conversation," asks where
the discourse of the collection "is headed" by inquiring into general concepts that
might offer the most basic horizon against which the collection makes its
contribution.58 The other, entitled "Pope Benedict XVI and the Desideratum of a
Natural Law: Three Views," asks, in effect, about the meaning of "from whence" the
collection comes in view of its origin in an initiative of Joseph Ratzinger, Pope
Benedict XVI. 59
1. Horizons of Relevant Basic Meaning
John Polkinghome, a physicist and Anglican priest from Cambridge University, and
Stanley Hauerwas, a theologian from Duke University, in their first panel, inquire into
the concepts they believe serve as the most productive basic horizon of meaning
against which to measure the collection's contribution. John Polkinghorne names, as
pertinent horizon, the awareness of ethical insight as a universal dimension of human
knowing inherently informing the method even of scientific research that itself is
unable to explain it.60 Stanley Hauerwas takes a rather different approach, setting
forth, as such a concept, appreciation for our vulnerability and need as creatures,
reminding us as he does so that theories and languages can divide as well as unite in
contrast to this state of dependency, which is universal.6'
2. The Significance of the Collection's Origin in the Thought of
Pope Benedict XVI
James Schall, S.J. a professor of politics at Georgetown University, David Solomon a
professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and I, a law professor at The
Catholic University of America, each a Roman Catholic commentator on papal
teaching in the public arena, in our second panel, reflect on the significance of the
collection's origin in the thought of Pope Benedict XVI. James Schall, S.J. finds this
significance in the "world historical" importance of the question Pope Benedict
frames, that is, of how world dialogue can today be joined over what it now means as
humans to relate to reality. 62 Co-panelists David Solomon and I shift to the separate
58 Stanley Hauerwas & John Polkinghorne, Avenues of Reflection: Opening the Conversation, post, pp.
55-62 [hereinafter Avenues of Reflection].
59 Desideratum of a Natural Law, supra note 39, at 63-69.
60 Avenues of Reflection, supra note 58, at 57-58.
61 Id. at 61-62.
62 Desideratum of a Natural Law, supra note 39, at 63. In his article, Natural Law in Medieval and Early
Modem Europa: Sismic Activity and Shifting Foundations, Professor Francis Oakley of Williams College
returns to a consideration precisely of ambiguity in the medieval synthesis, cited to call into question the
Pope's interpretation of it. See post, pp. 223-24, 236-37. Jean Porter a moral theologian at University of
Notre Dame in her article, Natural Right, Authority, and Power: The Theological Trajectory of Human
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question of the expected impact of the papal initiative. Citing the sociology of
cultural opinion and the modem research university, Solomon sees in these, powerful
extrinsic limits to the reception of the Pope's initiative because of their opposition to
"the very rudiments of natural law" and "intellectual violence." 63 I, for my part, ask
whether limits internal to the Pope's own vision flow from a certain skepticism about
practical reason's capacity to discover-as a matter of finitude, not sin-the
intrinsically correct political solutions to many societal problems wondering whether
the Pope entertains some degree of acceptance of some aspects of a liberal and
positivistic social world.64
3. Alternative Emphases and a Choice of Options
Thus, at least modestly conflicting positions emerge even in the opening tentative
explorations of these panels, with John Polkinghome and James Schall, S.J. voicing a
kind of confidence in the capacity of human beings under at least some circumstances
(with attention to reason and openness to grace, for example) to know fundamental
moral principles in common; and with, conversely, Stanley Hauerwas, David
Solomon, and I, each in his own way, acknowledging limits, and emphasizing
difference of one kind or another. Similar contending emphases present themselves
throughout the essays that follow. The reader is invited then always to ask whether
these can be united in a higher synthesis favoring unity or, as the case may be,
difference. Whatever the synthesis, the reader will, of course, wish to grasp the
specific underlying principles on which it relies.
B. The Collection 's Thematic Content
A logical first point of orientation for parsing the content that follows is to ask what
characteristics in the "world historical" situation eliciting Cardinal Ratzinger's
initiative the authors see as salient. 65 Its logical stopping point, no less clearly, is a
consideration of the inquiry by some authors into what more concrete applications in
law, policy, and politics of insights into moral reasoning. The middle step of setting
forth views on the central question of sound moral reasoning is more complex, for
closer examination shows that some views envision a unity in moral reasoning,
tending to a common integration of cultures, while others see some irreducible
diversity in moral reasoning so that unity among cultures, if it is to occur, advances
more minimally, through constructive or functional bridges across difference. The
contents of these essays will, then, be introduced in four steps, accounting for, in turn:
1) the details of the current global situation; 2) unity in moral reasoning tending to
lead to a common integration of cultures; 3) diversity in moral reasoning so that only
Rights, returns to the papal initiative for the sake of a reminder that the papacy itself, like all other human
institutions even within the Church needs to be subject to the critique of moral insight. See post, pp. 311-
14.
63 Desideratum of a Natural Law, supra note 39, at 65-66.
64 Id. at 6865 Id. at 63.
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a provisional unity among cultures is attainable through some secondary functional or
constructive step; and 4) envisioned applications of moral reasoning in law, policy
and politics.
1. The Current Global Situation
Two authors give particularly cohesive overviews of characteristics defining the
current global situation. They are, Cardinal Angelo Scola and William Schweiker,
professor of Christian ethics at the University of Chicago and ordained Methodist
minister. From his perspective as moral philosopher and moral theologian, Cardinal
Scola, in "The Light of Moral Insight," points to several relevant external factors-
i.e., "rapid transformations currently under way in the sphere of the affections, the
bios, technologies, communications, and the intermingling of civilizations and
cultures." 66  In parallel, he cites the pertinent role of certain ideas, such as
"axiological pluralism" a tendency to equate anthropology with an evolving bios and
a cosmology in which human history absorbs the concept of nature such that "[m]an
becomes his own experiment." 6
7
From his vantage as Christian ethicist concerned with public policy in an attitude of
moral responsibility, William Schweiker, in "Accepting and Assigning Liabilities for
Environmental Harms," paints the era in more empirically-oriented terms of global
harms, "whether through automobiles, high stack emissions, wanton use of resources
or the endangering of species," inequitably distributed whether through "geography,
poverty, underdevelopment" or "ignorance," describing the exceedingly complex
ways in which these harms and their distributions interact in overlapping systems of
"patterns and processing," resisting analysis under "totalizing schemes that attempt to
order social reality." 68  Schweiker describes the complex non-personal forces
determining aspects of the human associations within which we might assign moral
responsibility for such harms and their distributions, and, as well, to the "imaginative
construals of reality" upon which participation in these associations depends. 69 Not
surprisingly, he depicts the imputation of moral responsibility in this global world to
be subtle and demanding.
Other essayists highlight more particular features of our era with several
underscoring negative implications of the global market. In "A Worldly Church:
Politics, A Theology of the Church and the Common Good," Stanley Hauerwas, for
example, addresses an illusion of diversity the market creates by its "juxtaposition" of
consumer options, which, in fact, only undermines a genuine discovery of the
common good in local communities. 70  Kevin Hart, a professor of theology and
66 Scola, supra note 56, at 71.
67 Id. at 72-73.
68 William Schweiker, Accepting and Assigning Liabilities for Environmental Harms, post, pp. 342, 346,
349, 355.
69 Id. at 348.
70 Stanley Hauerwas, A Worldly Church: Politics, A Theology of the Church and the Common Good
post, p. 448.
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literature at the University of Virginia, in "Quest for Global Morality, Kantian
Diversion," touches on the negative consequences for local communities of "global
capitalization" and associated global international law and humanitarian institutions
with their attendant culturally-destructive Kantian-abstractionism. 71 In "God, Sex and
America: Decline of the Common Morality," Nicholas Boyle, a professor of
comparative literature and culture at the University of Cambridge, also cites global
capitalism as problematic, but he locates its problematic character elsewhere, namely,
in its functioning without a global political authority serving to situate it within a true
global ethical life.72
At least two authors cite tendencies within a global material culture to encourage
moral insensitivity or injustice. Michael Sandel, a professor of government at
Harvard University, in "Mastery, Hubris and Gift: Biotechnology and the Human
Good," for instance, describes a temptation in pervasive global technocracy to an
attitude of perfectionist control, which is inhospitable to human values.73  In
"International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force: Are We Fighting for the
Same Things?" Jean Elsthain, a professor of political philosophy at the University of
Chicago, outlines, for her part, the predatory character of a global arena in which
some sovereign state actors prey on their own populations or, if not that, then fail to
protect some groups in their populations from predation by others. 
74
Not every author sees globalization as entailing only negative challenges. In
"Openness to Moral Insight: Socio-Cultural Considerations," Katherine Tanner, a
professor of theology at the University of Chicago Divinity School, invites us, for
example, to find hope in the global interdependence and social differentiation across
national and cultural borders now allowing us to encounter others who do not share
our own understanding of "the given," in the very conversations in which we seek to
confirm our cultures. She develops the case for seeing this circumstance as the
blessing of a truer openness to the givenness of reality. 
75
2. Viewpoints Espousing Unity and Universality in Moral
Reasoning
In developing accounts of moral reasoning that they believe can sustain morally
sound law and policy in the contemporary moment, one camp of authors assumes an
inherent unity and universality in such moral reasoning permitting an integration of
common understanding across diverse cultures and contexts. Perspectives in both
philosophy and theology appear among viewpoints of this kind. In both domains,
authors focus their attention, first, on fundamental postulates and, then, on the
71 Kevin Hart, Quest for Global Morality, Kantian Diversion, post, p. 247.
72 Nicholas Boyle, God, Sex andAmerica: Decline of the Common Morality, post, pp. 266-67.
73 Michael Sandel, Mastery, Hubris and Gift: Biotechnology and the Human Good, post, pp. 153-54.
74 Jean Elshtain, International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force: Are We Fighting for the
Same Things?, post, pp. 319-20, 327-28.
75 Kathryn Tanner, Openness to Moral Insight: Socio-Cultural Considerations, post, pp. 174-75.
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integration of morally-significant social facts or the formation of tradition
transmitting moral knowledge within human communities over time.
a. Fundamental Postulates
The fundamental postulates of moral knowledge which enjoys unity and universality
are developed by several moral philosophers and by a number of moral theologians.
(1) Moral Philosophy
Of perspectives in moral philosophy affirming the universality of moral insight, John
Polkinghome's "The Christian Belief in Creation and the Attitude of Moral
Responsibility," has a freshness by virtue of its situation in scientific method, making
it appealing as the first to read.76 Cardinal Scola, Kenneth Schmitz, a professor of
philosophy at the University of Toronto, and Thomas Hibbs, a professor of
philosophy at Baylor University, each, in their essays, provide their own accounts of a
more fully developed supporting moral epistemology. Alongside these, Robert
George, a professor of moral jurisprudence at Princeton University, an exponent of
what Cardinal Scola terms the "New Classical Theory," 77 advances a mode of moral
reasoning with a like moral optimism but not sharing their metaphysics.
John Polkinghome, through an analysis of modem science and its value-neutral
causal explanations, places in comparative profile another equally valid, but value-
laden dimension of the human encounter with reality-i.e., knowledge of right and
wrong. He demonstrates the universality of ethical knowledge precisely by
highlighting the ethical dimension of the scientific method, which science itself
cannot explain. Polkinghome considers the Christian community by reason of its
doctrine of Creation, available to nurture this ethical dimension that he considers to
originate in the Creator.
78
In "The Light of Moral Insight," Cardinal Scola argues that the dual experience of
desire and of human fulfillment in relationship with others arising through fulfilling
desire opens the way to the recognition that inclination discloses the good of
fulfillment as such and, thus, to the moral life. 79 He asserts that moral knowledge is a
knowledge of human inclinations in their full breadth and, to this same extent, a
knowing by "connaturality"-i.e., knowing with an affective basis. 80 The experience
of desire, in this view, is revelatory of being so that our inclinations correspond to the
ontological degrees in which we take part as living and rational beings. Reason, in
76 Reverend John Polkinghome, The Christian Belief in Creation and the Attitude of Moral
Responsibility, post, pp. 137-47,
77Robert George, Natural Law, God, and Human Rights, post, pp. 131-34.
78 Polkinghome, supra note 76, at 141. In his response to John Polkinghone, Holger Zaborowski
expresses an interest in learning more about what a philosophically developed notion of Creation would
entail. Holger Zaborowski, Response to Reverend John Polkinghorne, post, p. 151.
79 Scola, supra note 56, at 77-8 1.
80 Id. at 78-79.
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this schema, formulates obligation as it moves from desire, recognition and
communion, to commandment.
81
In "Human Nature and Human Culture," Kenneth Schmitz offers a metaphysics in
support of the moral epistemology he would appear to hold in common in most of its
essential terms with Cardinal Scola. 82 Schmitz explores the "richly dense constitution
comprising the first principles of intelligibility and value that dwells within the very
depths of each and every being" and, thus, inform human knowing and acting. 83 He
sees human beings as sharing an ascending array of inclinations even to a certain
degree with nonhuman reality, and human knowing as uniting us with things by
liberating them for relationship through the disclosure of their intelligibility. 84 He
offers a vision of human knowledge as liberating moral agents by preparing them for
transitive action whereby they care for or use things. 85 Moral agency, in his view,
perfects our own characters, and culture itself is an expression of our inclinations and
freedom in the service of our purposes.
86
In "Creation, Gratitude, and Virtue," Thomas Hibbs shares essentially Scola's and
Schmitz's moral epistemology, but interprets it in the light of a theology of Creation
in reliance on a particular theological strand in Thomas Aquinas. 87 Drawing on the
idea of the radical contingency of created being, and the generosity of the Creator, he
sees the moral agent as imago dei and gives space to the history of sin, grace, and
redemption. 88 A duty in religion to worship and thank the Creator becomes visible
from this angle, as at the root of moral obligation.89 The thanks that we owe God is
not just for the sheer fact of his having brought something out of nothing, but for the
integrity of Creation as He now holds it in being. 90 Justice, in Hibbs' view, begins
with a sense of our indebtedness in our vulnerability and injustice in a prideful refusal
to acknowledge our weakness.
91
In "Natural Law, God, and Human Rights," Robert George takes, as his point of
departure, certain basic self-evident reasons for human choice constituting the
possibilities of human well-being and fulfillment.92 He finds, in these reasons, an
integral directiveness yielding knowledge of modes of responsibility that generate
concrete requirements of moral obligation. 93 He locates these modes of responsibility
midway between knowledge of the first principle of morality and the knowledge of
81 Id. at 81.
82 Kenneth Schmitz, Human Nature and Human Culture, post, pp. 87-99.
83 Id. at 89.
84 Id. at 90, 92.
85 Id. at 95.
86 Id. at 96-98.
87 Thomas Hibbs, Creation, Gratitude, and Virtue, post, pp. 10 1-14.
88 Id. at 106.
89 Id. at 109. Paul Weithman questions whether Thomas Hibbs succeeds in grounding moral obligation
through a duty in gratitude to God, since not having been in existence prior to being created ex nihilo, one
was not there to receive anything. Paul Weithman, Response to Thomas Hibbs, post, pp. 115-17.
90 Hibbs, supra note 87, at 104.
91 Id. at 111.
92 George, supra note 77.
93 Id. at 131-32.
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concrete moral norms. 94 George eschews the metaphysics of these other authors, so
that his approach entails, for example, no necessary reference to God.95 In George's
explication, such moral reasoning accounts for rationally-motivated action, virtues as
habits born of upright choosing, and norms of obligation, as well as grounds
contemporary human-rights practice.
96
(2) Theology and Religion
The collection's theological perspectives also include a number of views with
optimism regarding the universality of moral truth. With respect to the Christian
theologians among them, agreement takes shape as ecumenical consensus. The
representatives of the three Abrahamic faiths, for their parts, reach overlapping
agreement within an inter-religious dialogue. This agreement expands to add the
viewpoint of Daoism as the one Asian religion in the collection (with the proviso that
Daoism must also be reviewed below a second time in connection with decentralizing
viewpoints since it evades easy generalization). Each of these theological or religious
viewpoints speaks from within a particular tradition, so that it naturally implicates the
problem of mediation among traditions. Each assumes that the problem is not
insurmountable, but devotes only cursory attention to it. Some other theological
approaches-to be discussed subsequently-are of a decentralizing kind viewing this
same step of mediation as problematic.
(a) Christian Views
Robert Wilkin, a professor of the history of Christianity at the University of Virginia,
and Peter Casarella, a professor of Catholic studies at DePaul University, in their
responses to Kevin Hart and Stanley Hauerwas respectively, raise the possibility of a
Christian endorsement of a theologically grounded "compelling universal ethic."
97
Other authors, within the collection, offer substantive support for such a project. The
latter include, Stephen Westerholm, a professor of biblical studies at McMaster
University, Brian Johnstone, C.Ss.R., a professor of theology at The Catholic
University of America, and Cardinal Angelo Scola, whose essay, already discussed
above, embraces moral theology no less than philosophy. As a general matter, these
converging viewpoints stress Creation as theme, leaving Eschatology more frequently
a theme perhaps in the decentralizing essays yet to be considered below.
In "Christian faith in Redemption: Origin of a Moral Attitude," Brian Johnstone
proposes theological concept of "gift and reception" as foundation for common moral
reasoning. 98 He conceives of Creation as an unconditional gift from the transcendent
94 Id. at 133-34.
95 Id. at 133.
96 Id. at 133-34.
97 Robert Wilkin, Response to Kevin Hart, post, pp. 257-60; Peter Casarella, Response to Stanley
Hauerwas, post, p. 4 65.98 Brian Johnstone, Christian Faith in Redemption: Origin of a Moral Attitude, post, pp. 421-27.
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God.99 Humans, as recipients of this gift, can, he believes, realize the capacity for
fulfillment they have received by themselves giving and again receiving. 100 They can
take responsibility for Creation's gifts or sin by seeking domination. 1 1  In
Johnstone's view, redemption occurs through the resurrection as God's response to
Jesus' unconditional openness to God's gifts. 102 Johnstone interprets natural law as a
gesture of responsibility for gifts received, offering a corresponding interpretation of
some basic features of traditional natural law reasoning. 103 He likewise proposes this
same pattern of "gift and reception" as capable of ordering mutually creative and
respectful dialogue among diverse religious and moral traditions. 
104
Within the schema of his essay, Cardinal Angelo Scola adds a complementary
theological ethic to his philosophically-conceived natural-law reasoning, in a
seamless dynamic synthesis. As a matter of a theological ethic, he envisions Jesus as
fulfilling the promise of the gift of true life by the renewal he offers of relationship in
communion of love with God and others. 10 5 Jesus is, thus, "the living fulfillment of
the law" and, indeed, the "living personal law." 106 Jesus is to be seen, then, as the
fulfillment of naturally-knowable no less than revealed morality. The rational moral
law is, in this view, ultimately realized in a personal relationship, rather than
adherence to abstract norms.107 The Christian ethic can in this perspective, thus, be
said to be of personalistic universality. 1
08
In "St. Paul and the Knowledge of the Natural Law," Stephen Westerholm relies on
an exegesis of the Pauline writings to show that St. Paul affirms the idea of
universally knowable natural moral norms. 109 In this respect, Westerholm offers an
important New Testament scriptural warrant for the projects pursued by Johnstone
and Scola and endorsed by Wilkin and Casarella. Westerholm shows that St. Paul
views the gentiles as condemned and in need of salvation because they are in
violation of moral obligations known to them naturally. "10 He uncovers, further, that
St. Paul understands moral knowledge to derive from God and moral blindness as
arising through the suppression of naturally-available."' While Westerholm affirms
99 Id. at 421. Johnstone's theologically-developed perspective works in close harmony with the view of
Thomas Hibbs, which, by contrast, relied on Aquinas' philosophical development of a related idea. See
Hibbs, supra note 87, at 101-14.
100 Johnstone, supra note 98, at 422.
"' Id. at 424.
102 Id. at 424-25.
1o3 Id. at 426.
104 Id. at 426-27.
105 Scola, supra note 56, at 82-83.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 83.
108 Id.
109 Stephen Westerholm, St. Paul and the Knowledge of the Natural Law, post, pp. 433-44. Frank Matera
is slightly more cautious, saying that St. Paul gives a basis for "an obligating sense of right and wrong" that
allows human beings to communicate with one another about moral concerns. Father Frank Matera,
ResR onse to Stephen Westerholm, post, p. 444.
Westerholm, supra note 109, at 440. Frank Matera adds an interesting distinction by noting that St.
Paul considered his gentile audience to have the sufficient moral orientation to understand what the Gospel
was offering. Matera, supra note 109, at 445-46.
111 Westerhohn, supra note 109, at 440.
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St. Paul's overriding concern to be the transformative power of the Gospel, he
concludes that St. Paul acknowledges, nonetheless, the promotion of moral good and
restraint of moral evil by civil authority, however yet unredeemed that authority may
be, also to be a good.
1 12
(b) Dialogue Among Abrahamic Faiths
Representatives of the other two Abrahamic faiths offer views in an overlapping
agreement with the Christian views just set out. Rabbi Barry Freundel, rabbi of the
Kesher Israel Congregation in Georgetown, District of Columbia, assistant professor
of rabbinic literature at Baltimore Hebrew University, sets forth a Jewish perspective
on universal principles of ethical consciousness. Mahmoud Ayoub, a professor of
Islamic studies and comparative religious at Temple University, does the same from
an Islamic perspective.
In "God's Gift and Mindfulness of the Ethical Dimension as Human Response,"
Barry Freundel illumines a Jewish vision of moral reason as God's gift, illustrates that
Judaism teaches about moral reason through its theocentric scriptural narrative 113
which, according to rabbinic tradition, instructs not only through the words that it
depicts God as speaking, but through what it recounts of God's deeds and attitudes. 
114
The narrative offers God, in this respect, as a model for human emulation through His
acts of kindness and self-control. In depicting God as responsive to ethical criticisms
of His own conduct, it encourages human adaptiveness to true ethical insight. 115 The
sacred narrative of God's attitudes and actions, in this view, also supply ethical
direction for human social institutions. 116 Freundel relates that the rabbinic tradition
holds these narrative elements to be universally applicable since their chronology
precedes the creation of the Jewish people. 1l
7
In "Enjoining the Good and Dissuading from Evil: Social Morality of the Qu'ran,"
Mahmoud Ayoub illuminates moral reasoning in Islam.118 Beginning from the
cardinal precept, "Do Good and Avoid Evil," ' 1 9 he gives an exegesis of the theology
and anthropology informing Islamic moral thought, showing that, for Islam, God is a
112 Id. at 444.
113 Rabbi Barry Freundel, God's Gift and Mindfulness of the Ethical Dimension as Human Response,
post pp. 403-15.
Id. at 403-6.
115 Robert Burt takes this theme and develops it further to suggest that the biblical narrative teaches that
God cedes to human beings an independent role in propounding moral norms such that God himself is
bound by them. Robert Burt, Response to Barry Freundel, post, pp. 417-20. One may find worthwhile an
exploration of the similarity and difference of Robert Burt's explication of the mutuality of love between
God and human beings and Thomas Hibb's view of God's gift and human need. See Hibbs, supra note 87,
at 101-14.
116 Freundel, supra note 113, at 407-15.
117 Id. at 415.
118 Mahmoud Ayoub, Enjoining the Good and Dissuading from Evil: Social Morality of the Qu 'ran,post,
pp. 391-98.
119 Id. at 391. It will not escape notice that Ayoub's account of this statement in Islam appears
indistinguishable from St. Thomas Aquinas' statement of the first precept of natural law: Do Good and
Avoid Evil. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I.11, Q. 94, Art. 2 (Fathers of the Eng. Dominican
Province trans., Benziger Brothers 1947).
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moral God who expects our obedience as rational morality. 2 ° He relates that Islam
presents moral reason itself as God's gift, and shows that this is so on several
ground-Islam depicts moral reason as possible through a covenant of recognition
God made with humans at their creation; God as having made the subsequent gift of
Revelation and the Prophets; God as giving us His own example for emulation; and
God as bestowing His ongoing moral Guidance on human beings. 121 The good
expected as a matter of obeying God's moral commands in this Islamic view
presupposes universal respect for human dignity and, since it is social in nature, calls
for common restraint of evil. 122  Ayoub confirms the universality of this vision of
moral truth through the Qu'ranic teaching that the Abrahamic faiths and even the
nations of the earth share it.
123
(c) Dialogue with Asian Religions: Daoism
In "At One with Earth and Heaven: The Ethical Integration of Self, Society, and
Nature in Daoism," Lydia Kohn, a professor of religion and East Asian studies at
Boston University, after laying a foundation in Daoist cosmology, introduces the
reader to the several kinds of ethical rules that, together, guide Daoist living. 124 She
illustrates their integral inter-connection within a larger ethic oriented to a right
balance in the habituation of the emotions in admirable qualities of character and
action, 125 and, she illumines their resonance with harmonies of the moral agent's own
bodily state and the larger natural and cosmic order.' 2 6  Conduct and attitude in
conformity with this ethic will respect the rhythms, phases and polarities of the
natural and cosmic world, and ultimately harmony with the cosmic energy at the heart
of all things, the Dao.'27 She clarifies the "transmoral" character of the Dao in its
embracing wholeness. 128  She offers Daoism's cosmic integration, for its possible
pertinence to global morality.
120 Ayoub, supra note 118, at 392-93.
121 Id. at 393-95.
122 Id. at 395-97.
123 Id. at 395, 397.
124 Lydia Kohn, Being at One with Earth and Heaven: The Ethical Integration of Self Society, and
Nature in Daoism, post, pp. 365-84. However, these will resonate with aspects-now largely passed over
in the West-of a writer like Thomas Aquinas dealing with topics like piety and observance. See Hibbs,
supra note 91, at 107. It is of interest to compare her account with that of Kenneth Schmitz whose
metaphysics resonates at least to some degree. See Schmitz, supra note 82, at 87-91. One can ask, for
example, whether greater awareness of Daoist and related thought might lead to a rediscovery of
dimensional, integrative awareness that has largely been lost in the West to global detriment. See Schmitz,
supra note 82, at 91-92, 94-96, 98. It is also intriguing to compare her account with William Schweiker's
description of integrated patterns of systems making-up the global world as he analyzes it. See Schweiker,
supra note 68, at 347-54. Perhaps, the ethical consciousness Professor Kohn describes is suited, at
something like a transcendental level, furthering the integration of a more adequate ethical response in the
context Schweiker describes. Heather Elliott's response seems to suggest that this might be the case.
Heather Elliott, Response to Rev. William Schweiker, post, pp. 361-63 (offering the case study of "the
Methuselah Tree").
125 Kohn, supra note 124, at 381-84.
126 Id. at 372-76.
127 Id. at 366-67.
128 Id. at 365.
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b. The Integration of Morally-Pertinent Fact and Formation of
Traditions of Ideas and Practice
Lines of thought in the collection, assuming an optimistic moral epistemology, move
beyond philosophical and theological reasoning more narrowly conceived to
integrate, at points, data from the world of fact. In one instance, the collection
expands its reach to include a dialogue with psychology over the developmental
preconditions of moral agency. A number of authors pursue the quite different
empirical question of the conditions of concretely transmitting philosophical ideas or
moral practices in traditions over time.
(1) Psychology and the Emergence of Moral Agency
In "The Role of the Family in the Transmission of the Moral Life" Paul Vitz, a
professor and senior scholar at the Institute for Psychological Sciences and professor
emeritus of psychology at New York University, explores what psychology can teach
about the family's role in the emergence of moral agency. 129 He sets forth scientific
evidence, for example, linking the emergence of the human moral capacity to
maternal nurturance of the infant's capacities to attach and empathize. 130 A correlated
differentiation of love and hate is, in this view, a first sign of "prototypical and
unconscious" synderesis distinguishing good from evil.1 3 ' Similarly, he illustrates the
family's role in the formation of moral character and altruism through shared
narratives and structure, and its role in fostering moral cognition impacting moral
behavior. 132
(2) History and the Formation of Tradition
Several articles and responses engage the historical question of a culture's formation
of a tradition embodying or transmitting awareness of the principles of practical
reason over time. Some appear to view moral knowledge as ahistorical and, to this
extent, seem to reject the basic relevance of the question of history. Others view
practical reason as mediated in some sense by tradition transmitted through practice
arising concretely in history. These latter authors hold a moral epistemology that is
optimistic to the extent at least that they consider the formation of a common tradition
to be possible.
(a) Ahistorical Views
In "The Natural Law, the Laws of Reason, and the Distraction of History," Hadley
Arkes, a professor of jurisprudence and American institutions at Amherst College,
argues that knowledge of moral principle arises by direct apprehension akin to
129 Paul Vitz, The Role of the Family in the Transmission of the Moral Life, post, pp. 181-98.
130 Id. at 182-91.
131 Id. at 185-86.
132 Id. at 191-98.
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knowledge in mathematics. 133 Only belatedly discovered by some, moral law, in his
view, is not new. Institutions, in one period, may be more attuned to moral reason
than in another, but its principles are invariant and do not change. 134 Insight into a
principle such as the one that each person has an equal right to respected as
constituted as free, and not through extrinsic features like race, is, Arkes suggests, to
remember something that we, in a sense, already know, rather than as arising in a
specific past. 135 John Polkinghorne joins Arkes in asserting an analogy between
moral values and self-evident principles of logic and mathematics. He, like Arkes,
considers that, although human institutions are in need of perennial reform in the light
of basic values and although concrete discernment is needed to guide their
application, knowledge of these principles itself is not historical. 136 Robert George's
discussion of the question of history and moral values appears to have a marked
affinity with Arkes' and what appears to be Polkinghorne's view. 
137
(b) Historically Oriented Moral Epistemologies
Authors holding to an optimistic moral epistemology but who situate practical reason,
in contrast to ahistorical perspectives, within some kind of historical dynamic, align
themselves in two groups. One of these assumes, even if it does not in each case
outright emphasize it, that practical reason reaches its full expression within a
theoretical tradition culling what it needs for the formulation of ideas from the flow of
a dialogue arising and transmitted historically. Where theological, these viewpoints
appear to be more influenced more by ideas of Creation than Eschatology. Holger
Zaborowski, a professor of philosophy at The Catholic University of America, in his
response to John Polkinghome, notes this propensity. The second group sees
historically unfolding practice as the occasion for new insight into moral truth. It
appears to imagine more a tradition of practice than thought, and when theologically-
based, it appears moderately influenced by Eschatology.
(i) Moral Knowledge Accruing by Tradition
In his essay, Cardinal Scola cites a common normative "natural" patrimony" suited to
sustaining a conception of natural law with Aquinas as its leading exponent.
138
Kenneth Schmitz adds greater detail to this same description, referring to "[t]he
philosophical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle which received new light in
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas as well as in the Fathers and the Schoolmen."'
139
Cardinal Scola appears to introduce a distinction that is key to grasping the way in
133 Hadley Arkes, The Natural Law, the Laws of Reason, and the Distraction of History, post, pp. 203-04.
13 Id. at 215-17.
135 Id. at 211-12.
136 Polkinghome, supra note 76, at 139-41.
137 George, supra note 77, at 132.38 Scola, supra note 56, at 77-82.
139 Schmitz, supra note 82, at 88.
SPRING 2009 Introduction
Journal of Law, Philosophy and Culture
which theoretical ideas form the thread connecting tradition in this interpretation
when he distances himself in a certain sense from the "amalgam of cultural attitudes
and positions C.S. Lewis cites as legacy."' 140 Taken without more, he states that this
"legacy" will be interpreted as no more than "an ideological interpolation of certain
cultural data which, when subjected to close study are found to be transitory, even
contradictory and not the source of a coherent and reliable doctrine."' 141 In so saying,
Cardinal Scola may be suggesting that theoretical conceptualizations and their
justification, not the transmission of forms, attitudes, and practices, are the decisive
matter of tradition.
(ii) Moral Knowledge Emerging Historically
In responding to Katherine Tanner, Patrick Brennan, a professor of law and catholic
legal studies at Villanova University Law School, draws on the ideas of Eric Voegelin
to introduce an idea of differentiation of consciousness yielding over time, historical
breakthroughs ushered in by "rare individuals as prophets and philosophers and
saints" opening the way for greater openness to the given. 14 2  Again relying on
Voegelin, Brennan considers some cultural modes to block the full scope of practical
reason when they erect barriers to what can be asked or said. 143 In parallel, Holger
Zaborowski, responding to John Polkinghorne, points out that the scientific
establishment's resistance to Polkinghome's own ethical and theological views calls
for a causal explanation, as does no less the public's vulnerability to reductionist
scientism. Zaborowski says that this resistance invites a critique of Christianity's role
itself in somehow unwittingly eliciting them. 144 In Brennan's view, history allows
footholds for new starting points for traditions of a truer openness to reality and, no
less, for novel modes of interference in that same creative process. 1
45
Brian Tierney, a professor of medieval legal history at Cornell University,
responding to Jean Porter, a professor of theology at the University of Notre Dame,
explores a pattern in the Christian-rights tradition, by which new insights emerge
through precisely atrocities that cannot be adequately objected to under received
formulas. He says that this limit-experience can fruitfully lead to renewal through a
revisiting of a tradition's founding principles. 146 R.H. Helmholz, a professor of law at
the University of Chicago, in his response to Hadley Arkes, focuses in on the relative
inadequacy that history exposes in received statements of the principles of equity; he
advises methodological skepticism in attempts to translate notions of equity in
enacted legal rules. 147  Tierney, for his part, envisions the possible revision of
140 Id. at 73.
141 Id.
142 Patrick Brennan, Response to Kathryn Tanner, post, p. 179.
143 Id. at 178.
144 Zaborowski, supra note 78, at 150.
145 Brennan, supra note 142, at 315-17.
146 Brian Tierney, Response to Jean Porter, post, pp. 315-17.
147 R.H. Helmholz, Response to Hadley Arkes, post, pp. 221-22.
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traditions to reflect overlapping agreement on at least some basic concepts for
ensuring the decent treatment of people among the world's religious traditions, based
on evolving insight born of the experience of shared hardships.
148
3. Visions of Difference in Moral Reasoning as Starting Point for
Interconnection
A group of viewpoints in the collection, in contrast to the ones considered up to now,
approach the question of moral reason capable of sustaining morally sound law and
policy in the contemporary moment from the perspective of postulates of difference,
that permit at most limited functional or constructive interconnections among world-
ethical perspectives. This group again includes perspective in both philosophy and
theology. In both domains, authors address both postulates of difference and steps of
functional or constructive interconnection. By definition, these views interest
themselves in cultivating with integrity diverse traditions, rather than unitary
tradition. Their interest in psychology is not towards the integration of fact in quest
of a more comprehensive grasp of universal moral agency, but, to the contrary, in
unmasking pseudo-cognition as psychologically caused.
a. Moral Philosophy
Philosophical viewpoints in the collection discounting unity in moral reasoning
explore, in part, fundamental postulates of difference, and, in part, limited
constructive or functional steps of interconnection. The simple outlines of their
contributions with respect to each can most conveniently be sketched, separately and
in turn.
(1) Fundamental Postulates
Viewpoints in the collection treating human moral reasoning as fundamentally diverse
appear to be of three kinds. For convenience here, they may be termed particularist,
critical, and nominalist. 149 Particularist views include those of Stanley Hauerwas and
Kevin Hart. Critical views embrace those of Nicholas Boyle and Katherine Tanner.
A nominalist view is set forth by Francis Oakley, a professor of the history of ideas at
Williams College.
(a) Particularist Views
Stanley Hauerwas' purpose (to provide an understanding of the nature of the Church)
is ultimately theological but en route he proposes a particularist view of moral
148 Tiemey, supra note 146, at 316-17.
149 The use of "isms" to define these options is not in any way meant to be negative, nor is it meant to
provide an adequate definition for the viewpoint involved. Rather, it is adopted only for its functional value
in advancing a basic orientation to the relatively distinct options appearing within the collection.
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reasoning he borrows from Alasdair McIntyre. Hauerwas portrays practical reason
and virtue as realized in pursuit of the common good within local communities and,
thus, as inseparable from shared practice. He sees knowledge of the good as
emerging only as "'local reflection ... upon local political structures, as these have
developed through some particular social and cultural tradition."'' 150 Practical reason
and virtue are, thus, only realizable, in this view, in "a practical education." Moral
philosophy has a role to play in Hauwerwas' vision, but only where guided and
limited by the "'conceptual and argumentative resources of that same tradition.""
5
'
Kevin Hart gives a philosophical account of a theocentric ethic that is likewise
particularist since he sees its credibility as dependent upon the particularity of its
genesis in tradition and as oriented to the absolutely singular particularity of God. He
is not averse to "involving" natural law if it does not disconnect ethics from their
theologically-constituted tradition of origin. 152 Critically, he offers a negative critique
of a competing moral view purporting to make extraneous these very theological and
particularist elements. The view he rejects asserts the unity of a "common morality,"
in his view, via a false abstractionism associated with the Enlightenment, detaching
moral awareness from a lived-context in tradition, and from relation to God.
153
These two "particularist" accounts shift the focus to preserving local communities
of practical reason or religious belief in the face of disruption by state, market, or
abstracting ideologies. They do not, however, seem to entail any necessary rejection
of many of the terms of the philosophies of the Scolas, Schmitzs and Hibbses but to
stipulate that the cogency of these other views is contingent on their re-interpretation
within particular moral and faith communities that they, in turn, concretely and
organically sustain.
(b) Critical Views
Nicholas Boyle's critique reduces the moralizing discourse of contemporary public
life to no more than an artifact of a psychological mechanism that he traces to a
breakdown in an adequate empowerment of political authority. Boyle observes that
society, under the conditions of the global market, replaces a common ethical life with
an Ersatz of pressure to force the internal formation of ethical commands and, in
consequence, guilt.' 54 He explains this substitution of guilt for ethical life through a
Freudian psychological mechanism that enters into the public domain in a negative
dynamic that he explains via Hegel. Boyle endorses Freud's view that social
cooperation depends on the suppression of aggression generating guilt, which in turn
150 Hauerwas, supra note 70, at 454 (quoting Alasdair MacIntyre, Politics, Philosophy, and the Common
Good, in TuE MACINTYRE READER 234, 246 (Kelvin Knight ed., 1998)).
151 Id.
152 He leaves the door open to a revision of natural law that does not depend on a Divine lawgiver as long
as it expressed a clear heteronomy in which "the good precedes rights." Hart, supra note 71, at 246.
153 Id. at 246-47.
154 Boyle, supra note 72, at 267.
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is displaced in moralistic reproaches against others. 155 He then borrows from Hegel
to explain how this pattern has come to substitute for ethical life, rather than to remain
merely its psychological substratum: the global market, today, functions without any
state-like consolidation of power, capable of enforcing norms of conduct and Hegel
teaches that an ethical life can exist only consequent to the consolidation of power for
that purpose. 1
56
In her essay, Katherine Tanner's critique likewise reduces alleged moral "givens"
as the product of a psychological defense, but does so along lines differing from
Boyle's. Drawing on Jonathan Lear, she exposes a tendency in the quest for
comprehensive moral accounts "of the given" a propensity, at times, to seek closure
against reality on the analogy of a neurotic's perpetuation of illness through an
unconscious insistence on seeing the world only in disappointing terms.
157
Unconscious socio-cultural processes can, in her view, entrench a cultural preference
for "self-enclosure" too sure of the "veracity of what is commonly held" even to
penetrate to the truly "given.' ' 158 Tanner recommends a corresponding hermeneutic of
skepticism. 159 As a theologian, she invites consideration of the connection between
this closed-mindedness and sin.
160
(c) A Nominalist View
In "Natural Law in Medieval and early-Modem Europe: Seismic Activity and Shifting
Foundations," Francis Oakley, gives exposition to the "nominalist" vision of practical
reason of fourteenth-century William of Ockham distinct from the Thomistic
synthesis, and yet itself also embedded within the Christian tradition over centuries.
Oakley shows that Okham attributes physical and moral order to a "free and
inscrutable divine will" unbounded by "external standard"' 161 and that Ockham sees
the world as made up of "singular entities linked solely by external relations," and
the moral order as "a top-down legislative imposition by an omnipotent divine will on
... discrete individuals."'162 Oakley argues that the apparent instability for moral
norms in Ockham's approach is illusory since Ockham merely shifts the load-bearing
function from the philosophical to the theological leg of his philosophical-theological
synthesis, depending, in doing so, on biblical motifs of divine promise and covenant
to justify God's constancy in sustaining both reason and nature.' 
63
55 Id. at 261,263-64.
156 Id. at 265-68.
157 Tanner, supra note 75, at 165, 167-68.
'58 Id. at 167.
159 Id. at 169-70.
160 Id. at 164.
161 Oakley, supra note 62, at 229.
162 Id. at 229-30.
163 Id. at 233-34. Professor Oakley's account establishes several points of importance in relation to the
question before the authors of these essays. It demonstrates a deep-seated pluralism in Christian political
thought that calls for a credible response. It casts doubt on the adequacy of"a common normative 'natural'
patrimony" in the legacy of St. Thomas Aquinas taken alone, since Ockham's challenge to Aquinas
suggests that Aquinas' system may be more "subtle philosophical and theological diplomacy" than true
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(2) Concepts Bridging Irreducible Difference
Viewpoints stressing irreducible difference move, at a certain point, from the
postulates of difference themselves, to constructive or functional interconnections that
may, nonetheless, to an extent bridge cultures and traditions. The authors of the
essays reveal four kinds of such bridging concepts: 1) analogy; 2) attending; 3)
common grammar; 4) negative capability; and e) consolidation of power.
(a) Analogy
Kevin Hart proposes an analogy to bridge differences and to permit a limited degree
of common ground among diverse traditions of faith. He sees the "looseness" he
concedes in the device as, if anything, a virtue in contrast to empty promises of
formalism.164 He suggests that the method can work where the respective traditions
on all sides of the analogy share "deep parallels"' 165 and the term proposed as
analogous is "broadly acceptable" among them. 166 He suggests that agreement by
analogy at most can supplement local tradition at a second "tier" where it can be
variously enriched by them. 67 He proposes the Golden Rule as Christianity's
plausible contribution to such cross-cultural analogical moral dialogue. 168 Although
Brian Tiemey's focus is admittedly more juridical than Hart's, Tierney, in his
response to Jean Porter, likewise endorses analogy as a bridge to possible (limited)
overlapping agreement among religions. As a shared term, he finds "respect and
compassion for the human person" at the wellspring of the major religions. 169
(b) Attending
In "Mastery, Hubris and Gift: Biotechnology and the Human Good," Professor
Michael Sandel, prescribes a method of intercultural integration of moral discourse
that he terms, the "way of attending." 170 He does not ask local traditions to give any
kind of even lexical priority to any cognitive point of abstract or even analogical
agreement, rather he suggests that each religious and moral tradition may bring its
entire patrimony of moral resources, unsorted, to every common discussion of moral
concern. The bridge he, instead, proposes to discuss is a perception in common,
synthesis. It also invites a consideration of Ockham's counter approach as a potential basis for a
particularist theological ethic for Christian communities and a more pluralist regime based on Ockham's
concept of subjective rights, at least within the larger political order. In connection with this latter
possibility, Oakley calls attention, for example, to Ockham's influence on a line of thinkers, including John
Locke, contributing to the rise of the modem constitutional order. In addition, Oakley's account offers
ground for a renewal in dialogue between Christianity and Islam over the relation of ethical commands and
Divine Will.
164 Hart, supra note 71, at 254.165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 253-54.
169 Tiemey, supra note 146, at 317.
170 Sandel, supra note 73, at 153.
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where this arises, of the moral-unease-inducing qualities in concrete practices.
171
This method is one in which different traditions join in the "interpretive project" of
"mak[ing] sense of or diagnos[ing]" their collective discomfort in the presence of
practices they sense to be problematic. 172 As the product of this method, he envisions
shared attitudes, rather than propositions. 173  Katherine Tanner's proposal of the
cultivation of skepticism of self, in matters implicating cultural difference, seems to
complement Sandel's. Her method would appear to clear the way precisely for
"attending" in Sandel's sense, liberating a culture from the trap of "inattending" by
reason of unexamined "knowingness."1
74
(c) Grammar
Katherine Tanner and Stanley Hauerwas agree that a grammar can be the basis for
common conversation in which the interlocutor is permitted, in Tanner's vivid phrase,
to remain "irredeemably strange" and yet still of the conversation. 175 Hauerwas sees
language across difference as needed to foster listening to and grasping "the
intelligibility of diverse claims of injustice," and as a means whereby we may offer
"truthful judgments to one another and others that come only by having our
convictions exposed to those that do not share them."' 176 At one level, the appeal is
one for a kind of language within a particular community sufficiently open to
difference. At another, especially for Hauerwas, it appears to be an intersection of
diverse languages across diverse local communities permitting a conversation about
languages and over "similarity and diversity of the regional liturgies." 1
77
(d) Negative Capability
A number of proposals for bridging differences in moral reasoning put forward
concepts distinctively opening a negative space that can be filled by empathetic regard
for the other person, regardless of difference. Together, these concepts may qualify as
a subset of what Katherine Tanner, relying on Levi-Strauss, terms "floating
signifiers."' 17 8  They seem to channel what Thomas Keats called "negative
capability."' 79  They resonate with Karl Rahner's experience of limitation in
knowledge or freedom on the part of finite subjects, as transcendental.1 80
171 Id. at 154. Heather Elliott's use of the example of the Methuselah Tree would appear to illustrate
what Sandel means by the method of attending. Elliot, supra note 124, at 361-63.172 Sandel, supra note 73, at 153.
173 Id. at 154.
174 Tanner, supra note 75, at 169-70.
175 Id. at 173.
176 Hauerwas, supra note 70, at 458.
177 Id. (citing KARL RAHNER, CONCERN FOR THE CHURCH 91 (Edward Quinn trans., 1981)).
178 Tanner, supra note 75, at 169.
179 "[W]hat quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare
possessed so enormously-I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in
uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact or reason--Coleridge, for instance,
would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude [footnote omitted] caught from the Penetralium of mystery,
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Stanley Hauerwas, in his opening conversation with John Polkinghorne, offers, for
example, the concept of basic human physical vulnerability that comes upon us
without our asking, in just this vein. 181 Michael Sandel, similarly, offers the concept
of "the unbidden" as allowing us access to an appreciation of the other person's value
and restraining our impulse to master and control. 182  In "Respect for Human
Dignity," Gilbert Meilaender, a professor of theology and Christian ethics at
Valparaiso University, offers an extended meditation on the concept of human dignity
as a marker provided by our equal vulnerability to weakness and death precisely for
our equal human worth. Meilander distinguishes this meaning of human dignity from
another less fundamental usage, defining dignity on a comparative basis. 
183
(e) Consolidation of Power
As mentioned previously, Nicholas Boyle holds common ethical life to be impossible
without the presence of a state or a state-like authority. Correspondingly, power must
be consolidated and conferred on the state for enforcing shared norms of conduct
before differences in moral claims can be bridged as an expression of genuine ethical
life. 184 Therefore, for unity in ethical understanding to emerge under contemporary
global conditions, Boyle argues that there must occur first a state-like deployment of
force on the same global scale as the international economy. This will be seen to have
occurred only when "state-like processes, of attitudes, tendencies, and even
embryonic institutions, with ambitions to deploy the State-defining power of force,"
in fact, come to achieve global control. 1
85
b. Theology and Religion
Theological viewpoints aligning with the pole of greater skepticism regarding unity in
moral reasoning for the most part rely on the philosophical postulates considered thus
far. However, as distinctly theological contributions on this side of the collection's
balance sheet, the reader will wish to consider aspects of Stanley Hauerwas' essay.
The reader will also wish to return to a consideration of the theological dimension of
from being incapable of remaining content with half-knowledge." Letter from John Keats to George and
Thomas Keats (Dec. 21, 1817), in THE LETrERS OF JOHN KEATS 70, 72 (Maurice Buxton Forman ed.,
1942) (1931).
180 In one formulation, Rahner explains the idea this way:
Then is the hour of his grace. Then the seemingly uncanny, bottomless depth of our existence as experienced by us
is the bottomless depth of God communicating himself to us, the dawning of his approaching infinity which no
longer has any set paths, which is tasted like a nothing because it is infinity. When we have let ourselves go and no
longer belong to ourselves, when everything (including ourselves) has moved away from us as if into an infinite
distance, then we begin to live in the world of God himself, the world of the God of grace and of eternal life.
3 KARL RAHNER, Reflections on the Experience of Grace, in THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 86, 89
(Karl-H. & Boniface Kruger trans., 1967).
181 Avenues of Reflection, supra note 58, at 61-62.
182 Sandel, supra note 73, at 155.
183 Gilbert Meilaender, Respect for Human Dignity, post, pp. 120-25.
184 See supra text accompanying note 160.
185 Boyle, supra note 72, at 267.
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the concepts mediating negative capability just mentioned. As well, the reader will
wish to return to a further consideration of a decentralizing characteristic of Daoism,
as Livia Kohn elaborates it.
Stanley Hauerwas is unique among the Christian theologians in the collection in
approaching moral reason from the vantage of ecclesiology. In doing so, he proposes
a two-tiered approach in some ways parallel to that which Kevin Hart sketches in
connection with inter-religious dialogue. Locally, Hauerwas images the Church in
terms borrowed from Alasdair McIntyre to fashion a vision of the Church constituting
itself in local communities, speaking local vernacular liturgical languages, and
learning what it means "to survive" and in this discovering "what it means to be
human." 186 He depicts the Church as bringing theological virtues and a dedication
transcending the world's comprehension, to the task of discovering the common
good.' 87 At global level, Hauerwas relies on Karl Rahner's concept of the Church in
the global era, as necessarily Church in diaspora, suggesting that Christians, scattered
in their local communities, are called in Christian hope to strive for unity in "common
love of God" with Christians everywhere.
Gilbert Meilaender and Stanley Hauerwas specifically identify a theological
dimension of the concepts mediating negative capability, which they put forward in
what can be considered in the first instance a philosophical or ethical manner. 188 The
fuller theological and philosophical grounding that Thomas Hibbs provides, as was
seen above, for vulnerability as orienting the moral agent in gratitude to the Creator
can, in principle, be equally well applied to ground the views of Meilander and
Hauerwas and of Sandel, 189 although Sandel, himself, winning a skeptical response
for this from his respondent Stephen F. Smith, a professor of law at the University of
Notre Dame, in doing so, declines to limit the concept he offers of the "unbidden" to
its theological significance' 9" in parallel to the natural law theory of Robert
George.'
9 1
Livia Kohn's exposition of Daoist integrative ethical consciousness was included
above among theological approaches envisioning unity in moral reasoning, but the
cosmic integration and balance of Daoism, as Kohn explicates it, displays an
interesting ambiguity. These qualities appear to transcend the distinction between
unity and difference organizing this introduction for they seem to suggest in a way
that every person, every place, and every society equally forms a center of
harmony.192 In this respect, her account appears radically decentralizing. For this
reason, it seems appropriate to suggest that Daoism as Kohn illumines it be proposed
for reconsideration in this latter context of decentralizing theories. Charles B. Jones,
186 Hauerwas, supra note 70, at 460-61.
187 Id. at 451.
188 Id. at 451-52; Meilaender, supra note 183, at 125.
189 Hibbs, supra note 87, at 101-14.
190 Sandel, supra note 73, at 156; Stephen E. Smith, Response to Michael Sandel, post, pp. 159-62.
192 George, supra note 77, at 132.
92 Kohn, supra note 124, at 365-84 ("Every living being, everything that is created and has form has its
particular being because of qi. Qi is manifest Dao ....").
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a professor of Religious Studies at The Catholic University of America, in his
response to Lydia Kohn, emphasizes the lack of correspondence between Asian and
Western religious ideas. 193 Perhaps, his point receives confirmation here.
c. The Absence of the Integration of Facts or Concern with the
Formation of Tradition
Because they do not espouse a principle of unity in the sense that is of interest in this
collection of essays, the essays in question do not espouse a point around which they
are inclined to pursue the integration of fact or the formation of a general
philosophical tradition. In some other setting, however, one assumes that these same
authors might be inclined to advance integration within local, rather than universal
modes of thinking or perhaps to delegate that task to political or legal institutions
rather than religious or moral communities, relying perhaps on purely functional or
practical bridges among differences.
4. Applications of Moral Reasoning to Politics and Law
Ayatollah Amad Iravani, a scholar affiliated with the Center for the Study of Culture
and Values at The Catholic University of America, in his response to Mahmoud
Ayoub, advocates for an inter-religious dialogue on many issues of morally sound
social practice, observing that frequently such issues cannot be resolved by simple
reference to religious traditions. 194 The conversation that Iravani envisions ultimately
is one within the sphere of politics and lawmaking. Perhaps the majority of the essays
in this collection touch at least indirectly on these topics; several make them their
primary focus. In this vein, essays in the collection explore each of the following
issues: 1) political decision-making; 2) pursuit of justice; 3) the rule of law; and 4) the
recognition of human rights under law.
a. Political Decision-making
Cardinal Scola and William Schweiker, the two authors whose succinct, yet
comprehensive, descriptions of the current situation were considered above, are also
the two who bring to focus the question of political decision-making in pursuit of the
common good. In his essay Cardinal Scola addresses the contribution of moral reason
and faith to discourse in pluralized civil society. 195 Because convictions must be
"translated" into "public" terms in the pluralized civil society, he argues that
participants, individual or corporate, must, for this very reason, give tireless witness
to a "process of argumentation sensitive to the truth"'196 drawing on their moral
193 Charles Jones, Response to Livia Kohn, post, p. 385.
194 Amad Iravani, Response to MahmoudAyoub, post, p. 400.195 Scola, supra note 56, at 83-85.
196 Id. at 84.
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experience to "rediscover" "orientations and lines of the common good. 197 "Religious
traditions, in his view, should be subject to the same rules of "equal competition" as
others, but should not be excluded either from debate or enactments in law. 1 98 They
should instead, he suggests, be encouraged to witness to "the irreplaceable universal
concrete element" in moral awareness to which they are heirs. 1
99
William Schweiker proposes a more adequate structure for a public policy
genuinely responsive to global environmental harms. Grounding his approach
theologically, in an attitude of "gratitude and trust and devotion to service" but
tempered by Christian realism and an awareness of tragedy, 200 he propounds a mode
of "ecological rationality" taking seriously the novel, complex, and subtle pattern of
intertwined personal and impersonal factors accounting for global environmental
harms.20 1 This mode of rationality reveals a double challenge in making policy on the
assignment of liability of global environmental harms. The definition of redressable
harms and the conferral of standing to complain about them requires a novel
"depersonalizing [of] our concept of value," while the ascription of moral
responsibility and the assignment of legal liability 20 2 requires an unaccustomed
"personalizing [of] nonpersonal forces." 20 3
b. The Pursuit of Justice
Several authors in the collection advance modes of moral reasoning specifically as in
the service of justice as a political value. These authors contemplate justice as either a
counterpoint from which to criticize law or as pursuable apart from law in the
international arena considered as an "extra-legal" realm. In doing so, they rely on
rights language to express moral rather than legal imperatives. Authors considering
justice in this sense include, as a principal author, Jean Elshtain, a professor of social
and political ethics at the University of Chicago, and, as respondents, Carter Snead, a
professor of law at the University of Notre Dame, and David Hollenbach, S.J., a
professor of theology at Boston College.
In "International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force: Are We Fighting
for the Same Things?," Jean Elshtain makes a case for humanitarian military
intervention by some sovereign nations in the internal order of others, arguing that,
where a state subjects its population to barbarities or is unable to preserve internal
order so that all of its citizens are protected from violent attacks by other citizens,
other states capable of doing so should be seen as having the duty and, thus, the right
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would be a variant on ius ad bellum. Her model overall would be one of good
citizenship among nations. 20 5 Although its feasibility, in her view, arises indeed
through a world-wide currency of human rights and democratic discourse, she
grounds her concept not upon Kantianism, but it would appear, upon an Augustinian
concept of Christian love of neighbor.
20 6
Carter Snead, in responding to Nicholas Boyle, argues contra that human rights
concepts carry their meanings as moral terms apart from recognition by the state.
20 7
In fact, he asserts that it is precisely for this reason that rights are invaluable for
criticizing the de facto power of states. 20 8 Under domestic law, Snead cites as
illustration of this value of rights the need to frame objections to inhuman bio-ethics
practices, 209 and, under international law, he avers that human rights concepts serve
well to coordinate humanitarian relief in the face of local governmental interference
or inaction, citing international campaigns to eliminate illness.
210
Father David Hollenbach, S.J. in responding to V. Bradley Lewis, a professor of
philosophy at The Catholic University of America, argues for a universal ethic
capable of application across cultures and traditions for the sake of advocacy for
vulnerable individuals falling "between the cracks" of the state system.2 11 Quite in
contrast to Kevin Hart, Hollenbach favors Immanual Kent relying on the Kantian
imago of the human being as possessing dignity always an end, never a means, to
advance international solidarity in support of human rights.
212
c. Rule of Law
The framework of Law is propounded by two authors within the collection, as being
of decisive importance in the pursuit of both politics and justice. These authors are
principal author, Nicholas Boyle, and respondent, Cole Durham, a professor of law at
Brigham Young University. The parallels between them are several: each champions
the rule of law, criticizes efforts to foster rights via extra-legal conduits, and draws on
German idealist philosophical antecedents. Nonetheless, their conceptions of the rule
of law differ decisively by virtue of the respectively Hegelian and Kantian genealogy
of their ideas.
Nicholas Boyle, as we have seen, asserts that common ethical life can only emerge
"on the other side of' the consolidation of the enforcement power of the state. Thus,
in his view, rights, in the ethical sense, can only make sense in a functioning
framework of law. In an interesting parallel to Kevin Hart's criticism of floating
abstract rights concepts, Boyle deconstructs and rejects precisely such moralisms, but
205 Id. at 330-3 1.
206 Id. at 322.
207 Carter Snead, Response to Nicholas Boyle, post, pp. at 273-76.
208 Id. at 274.
209 Id. at 275.
210 Id. at 276.




does so from his alternative Hegelian foundation. While Hart is concerned with
moral meanings detached from niches within particular religious traditions, Boyle is
with meanings detached from their niches within the consolidated unitary structure of
law and power of the state or some state-like entity. Boyle asserts that the real impact
of rights concepts afloat outside of any regulatory framework is to enable the market
to become a mask for arbitrary and self-serving ad hoc imperialist interventions by
individual states. Boyle selects the American penchant for rights ideology, in
particular, for criticism in these terms.
213
Cole Durham, in responding to Jean Elshtain, promotes the importance of respect
for the rule of law as a requirement of justice. He asserts that the test of any more
particular claim in justice is whether at the threshold it is advanced with respect for
the rule of law, taking as the basis of his approach Immanuel Kant's philosophy of
law. Durham, thus, begins from the state of nature lacking any mechanism for
commensurating conflicting claims with the result that every effort to do justice,
because strictly unilateral, violates the freedom and equality of others.2 14 He calls our
attention to the role of entry into civil society with its enforcement of rights under law
in the making possible of redress of grievances within an order of freedom and
reciprocity. 2 15 Durham considers the same to be true among nations within the
international order2 16 suggesting that for one state to pursue intervention in the affairs
of another, based on a unilateral claim of justice without reference to law, is for it to
abandon civil society and return to a morally deficient state of nature.
217
Quite a few of the collection's authors express skepticism about the philosophical
elements Cole Durham brings from Kantianism to his rule-of-law analysis. They
show no interest in the Hegelian premise of Boyle's. It would be of interest to know
whether these same voices consider their criticism or reservations to extend, beyond
the narrower setting of moral, to the legal-philosophical occupying the interest of
Boyle and Durham. If so, one can productively wonder they might themselves
advocate fashion a philosophy of law, or some other rule of law framework capable of
sustaining international order.
d. Rights in the Jurisprudential Sense
Finally, several essays and responses within the collection concern themselves with
rights, in a sense more specific than that at stake in the discussion of the pursuit of
justice just considered. Jean Porter captures this more specific sense in her essay with
the term, jurisprudential. In "Natural Right, Authority and Power: The Theological
Trajectory of Human Rights," Porter defines rights, in this jurisprudential sense, as
"claims [that] may be said to generate law, or at least to provide a warrant, perhaps
even an exigent demand, for the creation of legal and institutional forms within which
213 Boyle, supra note 72, at 268-71.
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they can be recognized and enforced. '218 Three principal authors speak to this topic:
Jean Porter, Robert George, and V. Bradley Lewis, with respondents Brian Tiemey,
R.H. Helmholz and Kenneth Pennington, a professor of ecclesiastical and legal
history at The Catholic University of America, touching upon it as well. These
authors address both the philosophical and historical basis for rights in this
jurisprudential sense.
(1) The Content and Justification of Rights in the
Jurisprudential Sense
The authors addressing the philosophical basis of rights in this jurisprudential sense
fall into two camps. One of these camps advocates that rights be understood
principally in a "subjective," the other in an "objective" sense. Jean Porter is in the
first group, with philosophical support it would seem from Francis Oakley and
historical support, it would appear, from Brian Tiemey. Robert George and V.
Bradley Lewis are in the second, with implicit philosophical support from those
authors in the collection writing in continuity with the intellectual lineage of Thomas
Aquinas.
Jean Porter touches upon these two kinds of rights, both arising within the Christian
tradition-one, termed "subjective" and enacted into law as a matter of quasi-
necessity and, more readily termed "jurisprudential," the other, termed "objective," 219
receiving its essential content by exposition of the moral requirements of justice, and
so, in Porter's analysis, without necessary reference to civil law in its basic
articulation. Porter defines subjective rights as, individual moral "properties" or
"powers" defining "zones of personal liberty" and focusing on "self-determination
and personal control. 22 ° She finds a theological ground for preferring the subjective
version of rights in the concept of the human person as Imago Dei, that in her view
implies a human capacity for "free self-disposal," and in the doctrine of God whereby
divine love reflects "an incomprehensible inwardness" summoning a "correlative
response out of those capacities and deep choices within ourselves that mirror and
reflect God's inmost life." 22
1
In "Natural Law, God, and Human Rights," Robert George, by contrast, proposes a
conception of rights that is, in Porter's terminology "objective." Rights express, in
his view, principles of justice, requiring that people be treated as ends in
themselves. 222 Rights, so understood, however, have a direct and meaningful link to
civil law because lawmakers look in practical reason, to rights in this sense, to craft
legal forms.223 At the same time, rights are, apart from legal enactment, invaluable in
218 Porter, supra note 62, at 301.
219 Id. at 300-01.
220 Id. at 301-02, 307.
221 Id. at 308-09.
222 George, supra note 77, at 132.
223 Id. at 133-34.
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the critique of law. 224  Although George holds, as was mentioned above, the
philosophical justification of rights to require no explicit theological foundation, he
offers, nonetheless, a theological interpretation of rights parallel to Porter's in its
appeal to the concept of the person as Imago Dei. His use of the term, however, in
contrast to hers analogizes human choice and action to God's power-i.e., His "power
to cause things that one is not caused to cause," with the proviso that the analogy
extends to human choices objectively made "in light of one's intelligent grasp of their
value."
225
(2) The Value of History and Tradition for Interpreting
Rights in the Jurisprudential Sense
A number of authors in the collection explore the value of history and tradition
respectively, for interpreting rights in the jurisprudential sense. Plenary authors Jean
Porter and Robert George and respondents, R.H. Helmholz, and Brian Tierney, each
with their own distinctive emphasis, reflect on the historical question, while V.
Bradley Lewis and Kenneth Pennington, each likewise with his own distinctive angle
of perspective take up the question of tradition.
(a) The Historical Question
Jean Porter, calls attention to a correlation between emerging new forms of societal
structure and organization serving practical needs and the appearance of legal forms
advancing moral values-i.e., rights. She, thus, links the medieval appearance of
rights concepts with the emergence of centralization and formalized bureaucracy
facilitating their jurisprudential recognition. 226 Brian Tierney, for his part, as was
cited above, examines a countervailing correlation, namely, that which has often
existed between the occurrence of historical "calamities" in the form of wars and
persecution and the subsequent appearance of breakthroughs in understanding of what
decency requires of law in the accordance of moral protections for one's fellow
human beings.
227
Robert George and R.H. Helmholz, from their separate vantage points, speak to
opposing poles of concern within the dialogue between civil law-making and insight
into natural equity. Robert George starts from the insights of practical reason into the
nature of fundamental rights in the moral or objective sense, and proceeds to an
historical survey of the relative adequacy in justice of various legal systems. Within
the sweep of Western law, he would appear to consider legal systems basically
reliable in translating respect for persons into law, with slavery and the like serving as
224 Id.
225 Id. at 131.
226 Porter, supra note 62, at 301-07 (citing BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON
NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW (John Witte, Jr. ed., 1997)).
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cruel exceptions. 228 R.H. Helmholz, as cited above, starts from demonstrable errors
encoded into civil law throughout the centuries to reach the conclusion that Western
law cannot be treated as having been presumptively correct in its responses to human
dignity. Helmholz's observations would seem to suggest self-doubt as a useful
methodological postulate of moral theorizing.
229
(b) The Question of Tradition
In "Theory and Practice of Human Rights: Ancient and Modem," V. Bradley Lewis
argues for re- interpreting modem rights law and practice within the tradition of
philosophical reflection on law and politics rooted in pre-modem political theory.
230
He proposes that this project answers to the need of modem rights law and practice
for substantive theoretical support. He observes that the modem state that provides
the context for rights law and practice is in constant need of renewal, for in it the
''substance of community thins" and "human relations become attenuated and
legalized. '23 1 The tradition for which he advocates answers this need, with its rich
resources of political theory, which can be expected to contribute to a "renewal of
democratic political culture and a renewed consciousness of the good that transcends
the political. 232 The tradition that Lewis expounds supports the objective vision of
rights cited above. 233 Lewis finds additional support for his preference in
contemporary sources, citing, to this end, not only John Finnis, but also H.L.A. Hart,
Joseph Raz, and Neil MacCormick.234
Kenneth Pennington, in his response to Francis Oakley, invites consideration of yet
a different tradition, as supplying a basis for creatively and productively interpreting
rights in the jurisprudential sense, drawing the reader's attention to the extended and
rich tradition of canonistic interpretation of rights and law flourishing over centuries
in the medieval era. Pennington observes that the thomistic tradition does not alone
comprehensively account for intellectual currents at the medieval era, and that the
canonistic tradition is demonstrably distinct both by virtue of its participants and its
content. The canonistic tradition, as Pennington develops it, would support more a
voluntaristic interpretation of rights akin to the subjective theory Porter advances. 235
III. Conclusion
In moving from this introductory and anticipatory exploration of its themes to the
collection itself, readers will wish to call to mind that the collection's purpose,
which-in keeping with Cardinal Ratzinger's charge-is a quest for "points of
228 George, supra note 77, at 132.
229 Helmholz, supra note 147, at 221-22.
230 V. Bradley Lewis, Theory and Practice of Human Rights: Ancient and Modern, post, pp. 277-96.
231 Id. at 295.
232 Id. at 282-83, 296.
233 Id. at 289-90.
234 Id. at 290, 293.
235 Kenneth Pennington, Response to Francis Oakley, post, pp. 239-41.
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agreement." They will, therefore, wish to remain alert to points of agreement, for
example, on the philosophical basis for ethics across cultures and traditions. Here
they will attend to those viewpoints in the collection converging around claims of
universal modes of knowledge of human fulfillment of one kind or another, serving to
ground moral obligation. They will consider the convergence of viewpoints
appealing to the need for a more forthright witness to self-evident truths, regarding
the dignity of the human person and the nature of right and wrong, akin perhaps, in
some way, to disciplined respect among scientists for the demands of logic in
scientific research. They will give an ear, no less, to viewpoints converging around
the assertion of a universal significance of an underlying attitude of caring reverence
grounded in religion, for the cosmic dynamism of "givenness," understood as
Creation or as the Dao. Those among the Abrahamic faiths may wish, no less, to ask
explore views coming together on the critical importance for knowledge of moral
truth, of an acknowledgement of the Creator in an attitude of worship, thanks,
obedience, and emulation. In parallel, Christian readers will wish to examine points
of agreement converging on a Christocentric basis of ethical reasoning, whether
oriented principally more to Creation or to Eschatology. Where points of agreement
in any of these senses are found to exist, readers will ask how they translate into a
comprehensive philosophy, natural theology, or some other kind of theory that might
some how support an emerging common world-wide praxis or larger common
tradition.
Readers will, however, also wish to consider, no less, the significance of "points of
agreement" on the role that elements of difference have, not less significant that the
role belonging to any elements of unity. In this regard, they will wish to be alert to
"hard choices" posed within the collection's discussion, wherein one only of two
identified options can be true. Readers will not fail to observe that such an election is
required between certain of the collection's ultimately paired options: i.e., whether the
knowledge of moral truth requires reference to God or not; whether moral knowledge
emerges historically or not; whether a philosophical basis exists or not for bridging
particularist ethical traditions; whether human rights are to be justified in the
objective or the subjective sense; and whether Thomas Aquinas or William of
Ockham is right about what can be known of the good. The reader will then wish to
look for points of agreement on just how far the principle of noncontradiction suffices
to decide these elections in a trajectory leading towards some overall synthesis in
unity, but equally for points of agreement on the ways in which no such optimism is
warranted with the better course being to labor on, with integrity, under conditions of
irreconcilable difference.
Readers will wish to search for points of agreement, as well, on the ways in which,
even with regard to this deep-seated opposition of options, unity may be available
nonetheless on a secondary level. On such a secondary level, readers can look for
points agreement, for example, with respect to a universal value of negative critique,
liberating us for integrity in local traditions and partial insights by clearing away false
systems and ideologies creating only a specious unity threatening to alienate us from
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the depth and truth of our existences and freeing us from any unconscious proclivity
to misapply the drive for systematic moral knowledge merely to enshrine a
preconceived preference for ourselves. In the case of theological authors, the readers
will wish to look for points of agreement on the importance of avoiding the
temptation of pride that might mislead us into substituting universal domination for
the more modest and humble goal of simple understanding. In the case of Christian
authors, readers may look for points of agreement on the role of eschatological hope
for a unity not yet possible in the order of Creation under existent conditions. In a
positive vein, readers can look with advantage, for points of agreement on functional
and constructive methodologies assuming irreconcilable difference but yet bridging it
to some degree with respect for localities and particular traditions, whether such
bridges are projected by way of analogy, some shared grammar, or floating signifiers
enabling us to exercise a negative capability transcending cognitive differences.
As they consider the certain divergence of views the collection contains as between
agreement that is more optimistic and that which is more pessimistic on the possibility
of moral knowledge, readers will also wish to consider any points of agreement that
emerge on whether "irreducible" difference can itself ultimately be overcome in some
transcendental dynamic of the integration of knowledge, such that points of
difference, while true, can somehow yet become subject to eventual integration in
some progress in time towards the, at least, asymptotic goal of unity. If not that, then,
readers will, nonetheless, wish to look for points of agreement on ways in which
viewpoints tending towards difference can nonetheless dialectically somehow
incorporate elements of viewpoints tending towards unity, as, for example, through
the idea that a moral philosophy presented as true apart from tradition might serve the
truth where expressive precisely of a particular tradition, and, in parallel, the ways in
which viewpoints tending towards difference can be incorporated into approaches
tending towards unity, as in the universal usefulness of the technique of negative
critique.
Finally, readers will recall that the basic underlying telos that Cardinal Ratzinger
articulated for the project, that his initiative launched was sounder knowledge of the
"fundamental criteria for laws affecting the rights and duties." 236 Therefore, readers
will also look for points of agreement on how exactly a transit is to be imagined from
the various points of philosophical, religious, and theological agreement or difference
mentioned thus far, to greater acknowledgement of key "fundamental criteria" within
the realms of public policy, political decision, and lawmaking. Readers will wish to
consider where points of agreement are being proposed regarding the advocacy of
adoption of concepts, norms or values within the terms of or even as the constitutive
parts of legal institutions, and where, by contrast, such points of agreement are
suggested for vivifying communities contributing separately from law as such to the
realm of civil society. No less, they will wish to consider where the collection offers
points of agreement on the nature of the ideal of justice that should guide society or
236 Ratzinger Letter, supra note 1.
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suggests, by contrast, a rule of civil law as a first principle of justice. And,
undoubtedly, readers will wish to reflect, as well, on what particular role rights play
either as an expression of justice considered as an ideal or as a feature of a system of
laws allocating freedom and power.
Ultimately, the value of the ideas this collection contains, or suggests, cannot be
separated from their value for the particular communities that have come together to
create the collection and the communities that will read, evaluate, and decide its
reception. The collection and its reception are themselves, then, a testimony to the
existence and generosity of a number of intersecting communities dedicated to
inquiring into the questions identified as important in an initiative of Pope Benedict
XVI and less directly of Pope John Paul 1I. In considering these essays, readers may,
then, benefit most of all by becoming better acquainted with some of the key
representatives of these communities and taking the opportunity themselves to join or
to participate more fully in dialogue with them, and perhaps these communities may
themselves, to some small degree, be fortified as they, by way of the collection,
become perhaps even better acquainted with themselves.
It is also hoped that the collection may by example in keeping with Pope
Benedict's vision of mutuality of respect between the teaching office of the Church
and the Church's universities, serve to advance the cause of creative interchange
between the academy and the pastoral office in the Catholic Church. It is hoped no
less that because readers will be members of civil society and participants in its
political process they will avail themselves of the opportunity to reach "catch as catch
can" into the rich array of ideas the collection contains or may yet inspire, to make
their own concepts for creative deployment in public debate, in whatever perhaps
surprising ways that may help yield solutions to the pressing problems of the
contemporary day for the sake of realizing the ideal of an ever more adequate respect
for the value of the human person as created unconditionally in the image of God, for
the authentic good of the human community, and for fulfilling the call to stewardship
of a natural and human world entrusted to human care.
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